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The First Amendment and the Cable 
Television Operator: An Unprotective 
Shield Against Public Access 
Requirements 
By MICHAEL I. MEYERSON* 
Cable television is in the forefront of America's "communica-
tions revolution."! In the words of Justice Brennan, "The po-
tential of [t] he new industry to augment communication 
services now available is ... phenomenal."2 One of the most 
significant services which cable technology can offer is the in-
stitution of public access channels. Such channels, available 
on a nondiscriminatory basis for the use of the general public, 
present the possibility of a diverse, pluralistic medium, one 
through which members of a community can communicate ef-
fectively with one another. 
The Federal Communications Commission promulgated 
rules mandating that all but the smallest cable companies set 
aside channels for public access.3 The Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit struck down this requirement on the ground 
that the Commission lacked the statutory authority to issue 
the rules.4 The court added that, had it been necessary to de-
cide the constitutionality of the rules, they would have been 
found violative of both the First Amendment5 guarantee of free 
speech and the Fifth Amendment6 due process clause.7 The 
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision that the 
• J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1979; Member, New York Bar; Legal Writing 
instructor, Brooklyn Law School. The views of the author are his own and should not 
be attributed to any other person or agency. 
1. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 481 U.S. 241, 248-49 (1974). 
2. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 651 (1972) (plurality opin-
ion) (hereinafter referred to as Midwest I). 
3. Report and Order, Docket 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976). 
4. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), alf'd, 440 U.S. 689 
(1979) (hereinafter referred to as Midwest II). 
5. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... " U.S. 
CONST. amend. 1. 
6. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend V. 
7. Midwest II, 571 F.2d at 1056. 
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rules exceeded the Commission's authority, but did not ad-
dress the issue of their constitutionality, except to say that the 
question was "not frivolous."8 
The unresolved issue of the constitutionality of government-
mandated access to cable television systems must still be 
faced. Even if the federal government does not reimpose the 
rules,9 several states have already enacted their own access re-
quirements.10 This article will examine whether such require-
ments by a state violate the First Amendment rights of the 
cable television operator.ll 
Many commentators have assumed that the primary focus of 
such an analysis must be a determination of whether cable 
television is "like" a newspaper or "like" a television broad-
caster, followed by a routine application of the appropriate 
constitutional standard.12 This approach is both simplistic and 
needlessly subjective. The proper inquiry must be whether a 
cable access rule, "abridges expression that the First Amend-
ment was meant to protect."13 Accordingly, the effect of an ac-
cess requirement on the various interests served by the First 
Amendment will be examined. It will be demonstrated that 
those interests are furthered substantially by such a require-
ment, and in a manner which is not inconsistent with the 
Constitution.14 
8. Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 709 n.l9. 
9. The Supreme Court stated that the question of ''whether less intrusive access 
regulation might fall within the Commission's jurisdiction ... is not presently before 
this Court." Id. at 705 n.14. 
10. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-333(c) (Supp. 1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.05(b) 
(West Supp. 1981). California permits cable companies to be free from rate regulation 
only if certain criteria are met, one of which is provision of public access channels. 
CAL. GoV'T CODE § 53066.1 (West Supp. 1981). For an excellent discussion of current 
state cable access requirements, see Hamson, Access and Pay Cable Rates: Off-Limits 
to Regulators After Midwest Video II?, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 591, 619-30 (1981). 
11. The question of whether access requirements violate the due process clause is 
beyond the scope of this article. 
12. See, e.g., B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS PuBLIC ACCESS, 199-216 (1976); 
Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable Tv.' Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience, 61 
VA. L. REV. 515, 525-32 (1975); Ross, The First Amendment: A New Interpretation 
Needed/or Cable, CABLEVISION, May 18, 1981, at 120; Note, Cable Television and Con· 
tent Regulation: The FCC, the First Amendment and the Electronic Newspaper, 51 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 133, 146-47 (1976); Note, Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC: The First Amend· 
ment Implications o/Cable Television Access, 54 IND. L.J. 109, 120 (1978). See also Na· 
tional Cable Television Association, Cable Television, Government Regulation, and the 
First Amendment, 3 COMM/ENT L.J. 577. 
13. First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978). See text ac· 
companying notes 215-17, infra. 
14. See text accompanying notes 217-76, infra. 
No.1] PUBLIC ACCESS REQUIREMENTS 3 
To determine the appropriate constitutional test to be uti-
lized, this article will also explore the different possible classi-
fications of the access requirement: as local regulation of a 
locality's public streets; as regulation of a scarce communica-
tions medium; as a time, place, or manner restriction; as an at-
tempt to encourage diversity in mass communications, and as 
an incidental restriction on the rights of the cable television 
operator. Cable television access requirements will be shown 
to fulfill the standards for each of these classifications, whether 
a "reasonableness" test or that of a narrowly drawn measure to 
further important governmental interests unrelated to the 
supression of speech is applied.15 
I 
An Introduction to Cable Television 
Cable television16 is basically a system for carrying televi-
sion and other broadcast signals into the home by wire rather 
than through the airP The wire is usually a coaxial cable,I8 
capable of carrying many different signals without interfer-
ence.19 There are several different sources for the signals. 
Television stations, both local and distant, send out signals 
that can be captured by antennae.20 These signals are carried 
to the "headend," where they are amplified and sent along the 
cable distribution system. 
Once cable systems are established, cable television opera-
tors can also transmit their own programs directly over the 
15. See text accompanying notes 277-445, infra. 
16. The original tenn "community antenna television" or "CATV" described sys-
tems that received and redistributed television broadcast signals. Because of the 
broader range of services now offered, see text accompanying notes 79-98, infra, the 
tenn "cable television" is now used, Midwest II, 440 U.S. at '697 n.6. 
17. For a brief history of the development of cable television, see generally M. 
HAMBURG, ALL ABOUT CABLE 1-20 (1979). 
18. A coaxial cable is a "copper or copper coated aluminum wire surrounded by an 
insulating layer of air or plastic foam ... The insulating layer is covered with tubular 
shielding composed of tiny strands of braided copper wire, or a seamless aluminum 
sheath, and protective outer jacket." NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON CABLE TELEVI-
SION, CABLE COMMUNICATIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 265 (1981). Some cable companies 
use glass fiber instead of coaxial cables to carry the signals. One fiber, the width of a 
human hair, can replace a 3/4 inch cable and carry more channels for a longer distance. 
See Brown, TV:' Use oj Fiber Transmission Begins, N.Y. Times, July 9,1976, at AI, col. 
3. 
19. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-62 (1968); see 
also W. BAER, CABLE TELEVISION: A HANDBOOK FOR DEClSIONMAKING 3-4 (1973). 
20. See text accompanying notes 71-72, infra. 
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cables and onto unused channels.21 In the 1970's, accessible 
communications satellites made it possible for a single com-
munications source to transmit programs simultaneously to 
cable television systems all over the country.22 This marked 
the birth of so-called "pay television." 
With the advances in technology and the concomitant in-
crease in the services provided by cable television, there has 
been an explosive growth in the number of cable television 
systems and subscribers.23 In 1952, there were 70 cable sys-
tems serving 70,000 subscribers.24 By 1975 there were over 3,400 
systems serving 9.8 million subscribers.25 In 1981 there were 
over 4,400 systems serving 17.2 million subscribers, more than 
one-fifth of all television households.26 Current estimates are 
that by 1990 more than 60% of all United States television 
households, over 57 million households, will be cable television 
subscribers.27 
A. Economics of Cable Television 
The construction of a modern cable television system, partic-
ularly in urban areas, is an extremely expensive undertaking. 
The most costly aspect is the distribution system: the cables 
which carry the signals from the headend antennae to the indi-
vidual subscribers. Cost for the distribution systems vary 
widely.28 In suburbs where cables can be strung overground 
on existing utility and telephone poles, the cost can range from 
$4,500 to $14,000 a mile.29 If the cables must be laid under-
21. See text accompanying notes 79-82, infra. 
22. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Industries, 507 F. Supp. 412, 415 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 7 Media. L. Rptr .. 1342 (2d Cir. 1981) (not formal opinion of court 
of appeals). See also text accompanying notes 83-92, infra. 
23. In Midwest I, Chief Justice Burger referred to the "almost explosive develop-
ment of CATV." 406 U.S. at 676 (concurring opinion). See also Southwestern Cable 
Co., 392 U.S. at 162-63. 
24. Taylor, In Scramble to Bring Cable TV to Your Area, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD 
REPORT, Oct. 6, 1980, at 48. 
25. Home Box Office Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
26. BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981). 
27. Cable Stats, CABLEVlSION, Jan. 4,1982, at 55. 
28. ''This variation results not from the cost of cable and electronics, but because 
of the almost infinite construction possibilities." Cable Television Information Center, 
Cable Economics 11 (1972) (hereinafter Cable Economics). 
29. See, e.g., W. BAER, supra note 19, at 47; Taylor, supra note 24, at 48; BROADCAST-
ING/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981). Rates for pole attachment are now set by the Fed-
eral Communications Commission pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 224 (1981). 
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ground, the cost is far higher.30 While in sparsely populated 
areas it might cost less than $10,000 a mile to put down under-
ground cable,31 in the heavily populated urban areas the cost 
can be $25,000 to $50,000 or more.32 In parts of San Francisco, 
for example, it costs $100,000 a mile to put in the cables while 
avoiding the city's sewer system.33 
There are other major elements of a cable television com-
pany's initial capital investment in addition to the distribution 
system. The headend equipment, including construction of 
tower, antenna, and processing equipment, can cost well over 
$100,000.34 There are also costs directly related to the number 
of subscribers. These include drop lines into each home and 
subscriber terminals.35 
The considerable start-up costs have led to a change in the 
structure of the cable television industry. Where once the typi-
cal cable operators were small "mom-and-pop" businesses, 
most cable systems today are not individually owned.36 Addi-
tionally, many smaller systems are being acquired by larger 
companies.37 As of December, 1980, 50 of the largest multiple 
systems operators (M.S.O.'s) owned 75% of the nation's cable 
television. systems.38 
Another facet of the economics of cable television is that 
most of the cable operator's investment is for equipment and 
facilities shared by the subscribers. The marginal cost attribu-
table to any additional subscriber is relatively small.39 There-
fore, costs-per-subscriber decrease as the number of 
30. Costs for· placing underground cables can increase dramatically, depending on 
soil and ground conditions, number of cables, whether existing conduits may be used 
or whether they must be relocated. See Cable Economics, supra note 28, at 11. 
31. W. BAER, supra note 19, at 47; BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981). 
32. Taylor, supra note 24, at 48. 
33. Cable TV.' The Race to Plug In, BUSINESS WEEK, Dec. 8, 1980, at 67. 
34. Cable Economics, supra note 28, at 11. 
35. See Inquiry into the Economic Relationship between Television Broadcasting 
and Cable Television, 71 F.C.C.2d 632, 666 (1979) (hereinafter Economic Inquiry). 
36. "This isn't a 'mom and pop' industry that needs protection anymore. Mom and 
pop are now playing golf in Palm Springs with the money they made selling their cable 
system to a conglomerate." Shenon, Cable TV:S Benefactor Comes under Fire, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 9,1981,3, at 6, col. 1 (quoting David Ladd, U.S. Register of Copyrights). See 
also Gits, Media Concentration: Conglomerates Take Cable's Bait, CABLEVISION, Dec. 
15,1980, at 128-50; How Cable Works, N.Y. Times, July 5,1981, at 25, col. 3. 
37. See Cable TV: The Race to Plug In, supra note 33, at 68. 
38. Id. 
39. Economic Inquiry, supra note 35, at 667; W. BAER, supra note 19, at 52. 
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subscribers increases.40 
It is the number of subscribers that determines the financial 
success or failure of a cable system.41 The degree of penetra-
tion-the percentage of homes potentially serviced by the 
cable system that sign up for the service-necessary for a sys-
tem's success will vary according to the amount of necessary 
capital investment and the number of homes per square mile. 
Estimates of the penetration necessary for a system to break 
even range from 20% to 40%.42 
A 1979 study by the Federal Communications Commission43 
concluded that in areas where there is adequate over-the-air 
reception of television broadcast signals,44 the ultimate pene-
tration rate for cable television systems is significantly lim-
ited.45 The maximum penetration rates in the urban areas of 
the 100 largest television markets46 were predicted to reach be-
tween 20% and 40%.47 The F.C.C. concluded that with a ceiling 
of 40% penetration in the largest cities, "the total number of 
cable subscribers in all markets will not be greater than about 
forty-eight percent of the total number of television, house-
holds within the foreseeable future .... "48 
Both the economics of scale and the limited potential for 
penetration have created a situation where most cable opera-
tors face no direct competition from other cable companies 
within their own franchised area. In over 99.9% of the localities 
wU'ed for cable television, there is only one cable company.49 
B. The Question of Natural Monopoly 
Much of the early discussion of the proper role of govern-
ment regulation of the cable television industry assumed that 
the distribution function of a cable television system was a 
"natural monopoly" in the area which it served.50 Some courts 
40. See W. BAER, supra note 19, at 50. 
41. Cable Economics, supra note 28, at 11. 
42. See W. BAER, supra note 19, at 41-42; Kennedy, Small Towns Join Forces to Get 
Cable T. V., N.Y. Times, Mar. 2, 1969, at Bl, col. 2. 
43. Economic Inquiry, supra note 35; 71 F.C.C.2d 632 (1979). 
44. Adequate over-the-air reception means both availability of more than a few 
broadcast signals and strong quality reception. Id. at 669. 
45. Id. at 662. 
46. 47 C.F.R. § 76.51 (1980), 
47. Economic Inquiry, supra note 35, at 669. 
48. Id. at 672. 
49. See text accompanying note 59, irifra. 
50. See, e.g., TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), affd without 
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have held that, to the contrary, because it may be physically 
possible for more than one cable television company to serve a 
community, cable television, unlike either broadcast television 
stations or utilities providing electrical service, is not a natural 
monopoly.51 
Professor Richard Posner has defined "natural monopoly" as 
the condition which occurs when it is less expensive for the 
first firm in an area to supply service or products to additional 
customers than for a new entrant in the area, "not because the 
firm is more efficient in the sense that its cost curve lies below 
those of other firms ... but because one firm can supply the 
entire output demanded at a lower cost than could more than 
one firm."52 According to Professor Posner, this condition 
arises when fixed costs, those not affected by changes in the 
amount of goods or services produced, are very large in rela-
tion to the amount of consumer demand: "If the fixed costs can 
be spread over the entire output of the market, a firm supply-
ing that output may have a lower average cost of production 
than, say, two firms, each of which incurs the same fixed costs 
but spreads them over only one half the output."53 
Cable television appears to meet this definition of a natural 
monopoly.54 The largest portion of a cable company's ex-
opinion, 396 U.S. 556 (1970); The Cabinet Committee on Cable Television, CABLE 20 
(1974) (hereinafter Cabinet Committee); THE SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNI-
CATIONS, ON THE CABLE 5 (1971) (hereinafter SLOAN COMMISSION). Cj Red Lion Broad-
casting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("lilt is the purpose of the First Amendment to 
preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, 
rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the Gov-
ernment itself or a private licensee"). 
51. See, e.g., Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F. Supp. 652, 657 (N.D. 
Ohio 1968), aJf'd sub nom. Wonderland Ventures, Inc. v. City of Sandusky, 423 F.2d 548 
(6th Cir. 1970); Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035, 
1039-40 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 50 U.S.L. W. 4144 (1982) (her-
einafter Boulder I). 
52. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 139-49 (1978). 
53. Id. at 140. 
54.There are no current adequate substitutes for cable television. In United 
States v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co." 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956), the Supreme Court 
said that to determine the components of a single product market, one must examine, 
"products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are 
produced-price, use and qualities considered." Over-the-air broadcast television is 
not interchangeable with cable; not only are the number of broadcast channels often 
either limited in number or poorly received by a community, see text accompanying 
notes 71-72, irifra, but the current channel capacity of cable, see text accompanying 
notes 76-78, irifra, offers far more variety than over-the-air broadcasting. See Posner, 
Natural Monopoly and its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 642-43 (1969). Movies and 
live theater are much more expensive for a family to view than cable and they require 
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penses, such as the headend and distribution system, are fixed 
costS.55 These costs are both extremely high and independent 
of the number of subscribers to the cable system.56 Addition-
ally, having competing cable companies is economically ineffi-
cient since each company would have to duplicate the cables 
and equipment of the others.57 
Cable television has indeed developed as a monopoly indus-
try throughout the country.58 Of the 4,200 cable television sys-
tems currently operating, there are an estimated eight 
instances of so-called "overbuilds"-two cable companies com-
peting for the same subscribers.59 Historically, overbuilds 
have been eliminated by one company buying out the other,60 
though occasionally other agreements are reached, such as di-
viding the locality among the competing cable companies with 
the understanding that no company will go into another's "pri-
ority service area" unless that company has clearly failed to 
meet its commitments in its priority area.61 
the family to leave its home. The new technologies, such as direct broadcast satellites, 
multipoint distribution service, and subscription television, while potentially competi-
tive with cable television, see Botein, Jurisdictional and Antitrust Considerations in 
the Regulation of the New Technologies, 25 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 863, 880-82 (1980), are 
currently significantly more expensive, less accessible, and able only to offer consider-
ably less diversified programming than cable. See MAJORITY STAFF OF HOUSE SUB-
COMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCE, 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION (1981), excerpted in Emerging Competition, 
CABLEVISION, Dec. 7, 1981, at 285. See also National League of Cities, supra note 12, at 
22. 
55. See text accompanying notes 28-34, infra. 
56. See text accompanying notes 38-40, infra; see also Economic Inquiry, supra 
note 35, at 666-67; Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 10. 
57. R. POSNER, CABLE TELEVISION: THE PROBLEM OF LoCAL MONOPOLY 1 (1970). 
58. Although many states require that cable franchises be "non-exclusive," e.g., 
HAw. REV. STAT. § 440G-8(d) (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.05(6) (West Supp. 
1981), that non-exclusivity is not used to create competition but only to permit a com-
munity to award a second franchise if the first company does not perform properly. 
E.g., Dawson, How Safe Is Cable's Natural Monopoly?, CABLEVISION, June 1, 1981, at 
343. Cable companies also generally are reluctant to enter a community which has 
already been wired: "[i)n reality, if one operator has 'built' a city, another cable opera-
tor isn't going to build another system." Courts Ponder Status of Cable TV to Rule 
Legality of Regulation, Wall St. J., Dec. 29,1980, at ll, col. 1 (quoting James Ewalt, an 
attorney with the National Cable Television Association). 
59. Dawson, supra note 58, at 340. 
60. Id. at 333-34. 
6l. Id. at 334. This is how the "problem" of overbuilds was resolved in Allentown, 
Pennsylvania. The solution avoid changing the original non-exclusive franchise per-
mits into an exclusive franchise agreement, yet created a situation where, "as long as 
performance is up to standards, nobody has to worry about someone else encroaching 
on his turf." Id. at 339. 
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There does appear to be merit, however, in the argument 
that some competition is possible among cable television sys-
tems. While at least one court has mistakenly assumed that 
the large number of channels which can be carried through a 
cable eliminates the danger of monopoly control of all those 
channels,62 other courts have argued, more to the point, that 
current technology permits more than one distribution system 
to exist in a given area.63 In Community Communications Co. 
v. City of Boulder, the trial judge found that there could be 
more than one cable company using the same poles.64 This ca-
pability, according to the court, would permit between two and 
four cable companies to compete for the same subscribers.65 
The city of Phoenix, Arizona has actually authorized direct 
competition among cable companies.66 After complaints sur-
faced that the first franchised company was not wiring the city 
quickly enough, other companies requested the opportunity to 
operate in the city. The city council awarded franchises to 
three other companies. Phoenix was divided into sections and 
companies now must get permits to wire any section. After 
two companies have obtained permits for a section, however, 
62. Greater Fremont, 302 F. Supp. at 657 n.5; see also Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 
44-45. The court in Greater Fremont stated that since, "a cable with 12 wires can in 
theory carry 132 messages at the same time," therefore, "132 CATV systems, each en-
tirely independent of all the others, could in theory be earned in a cable the size of 
one's thumb." 302 F. Supp. at 657 n.5. The court ignored the fact that as long as only 
one cable company controlled the cable, there was, rather than a multitude of systems, 
only one CATV system: 
The private power of the cable system operator is potentially great, because of 
the local monopoly characteristics of cable. Unless restrained in some man-
ner, the system operator could control all of the channels on his cable system, 
which could constitute the bulk of the channels of electronic communications 
in a particular locale. 
Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 19. 
63. See, e.g., Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46; Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1039-40; 
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 496 F. Supp. 823 (D. Colo. 1980), 
rev'd, 7 Media L. Rptr. 1649 (10th Cir. 1981) (hereinafter Boulder II). Boulder I and 
Boulder II dealt with the right of a city to bar a cable company from wiring a part of 
the city so it could award franchises to competing companies. In Boulder I, the 
Supreme Court ruled that cities were not immune from antitrust liability and re-
manded the case for a determination of whether there had been a violation of the anti-
trust laws. 50 U.S.L.W. at 4148. In Boulder II, decided by the court of appeals before 
the Supreme Court's Boulder I decision, the court of appeals held that the prohibition 
did not violate the cable company's First Amendment rights. 7 Media L. Rptr. at 1996-
2000. 
64. 485 F. Supp. at 1040. See note 63, supra, discussion of Boulder II. 
65. Id. See Boulder I, 630 F.2d at 712 (Markey, J., dissenting). 
66. Dawson, supra note 58, at 358-59. 
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the only way a third company can obtain a permit for that sec-
tion is by demonstrating that it has the support of a majority of 
the residents of that section because inadequate service is be-
ing provided by either one or both of the companies already in 
the area.67 
It appears that while cable television has many of the charac-
teristics of a natural monopoly, some competition is possible 
within a given area. However, there is no evidence that such 
competition can ever involve more than an extremely limited 
number of competitors. The trial court in Boulder I did not 
envision more than a handful of cable companies,68 and there 
is no instance anywhere in the country today of more than two 
companies competing directly.69 Thus it does not appear possi-
ble for there to be a "wide variety of competitors vying for the 
public's attention."70 Because of the greater competition 
among operators, it may be more accurate to term cable televi-
sion not a "natural monopoly" but, rather, a "natural 
oligopoly. " 
C. Services Offered by Cable Television 
The first commercial cable television systems built in the 
1950's served rural communities having poor or nonexistent 
over-the-air reception of television broadcast signals.71 These 
systems provided either or both of two services: supplement-
ing local broadcasting by improving the reception of local sta-
tions, and importing distant signals into communities that 
were far away from the broadcasting station.72 
The next systems were built to bring a greater variety of pro-
gramming into communities which already had adequate over-
the-air television reception. In 1961, viewers in San Diego who 
already received three local channels were given the opportu-
nity to see all of the Los Angeles channels as well. The cable 
system offered four new independent statioris which presented 
67. Id. at 359. 
68. See text accompanying notes 63-65, supra. 
69. E.g., Dawson, supra note 58, at 359. 
70. Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 20. 
71. See M. HAMBURG, supra note 17, at 5. The first commercial community antenna 
system was constructed in the town of Landsford, Pennsylvania. The system offered 
reception of three broadcast television channels to subscribers who paid an installa-
tion charge and monthly fee. Id. 
72. See id. at 7; Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. at 163; Columbia Pictures, 507 F. 
Supp. at 415. 
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sports, old movies, and reruns of old shows plus the local pro-
gramming shown by the three network affiliates.73 Today, the 
San Diego system is the largest in the country, with 209,000 
subscribers.74 
In most other large cities, however, the possible availability 
of distant signals was not enough to attract sufficient subscrib-
ers to make construction of cable systems economically viable. 
Additional programming was necessary both to bring in more 
subscribers and to raise more revenue from those who did be-
come subscribers.75 
As technology advanced, cable systems developed the capac-
ity to offer an increasing number of channels. Whereas the 
earliest cable systems offered three or four channels,76 and the 
systems constructed during most of the 1960's and 1970's car-
ried 12 channels,77 the current "state of the art" can offer 35 
channels and some systems are being built to offer 50 channels 
or more.78 
1. Local Origination. The first way in which cable television 
companies utilized channel capacity which was not being used 
for carrying television broadcast programming was through 
"cablecasting,"79 the transmission to subscribers of programs 
which the cable companies themselves had originated.80 Much 
of this cablecasting is of a very simple nature. For example, a 
video camera will scan back and forth over time and weather 
measuring instruments.81 Other systems present a full range 
of programming, including both live and videotape offerings.82 
73. M. HAMBURG, supra note 17,- at 25. 
74. Cable Stats, CABLEVISION, December 21, 1981 at 152. 
75. See Columbia Pictures, 507 F. Supp. at 415. 
76. See text accompanying notes 71, supra. 
77. See Columbia Pictures, 507 F. Supp. at 422. See generally Spillman, Multiplay: 
A Case oj Diminishing Returns, CABLEVISION, June I, 1981, at 137-43. 
78. See Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 22; Boulder 1,485 F. Supp. at 1036; Columbia 
Pictures, 507 F. Supp. at 422. The franchise agreement for New Orleans calls for 108 
channels on its cable system; for Cincinnati, the agreement is for 86 channels. Panero, 
The Winning Combinations: What it Took to Win in Eight Big Cities, CABLEVISION, 
June I, 1981, at 310-14. 
79. "Cablecasting" refers to programming distributed on the cable system which 
is, "subject to the exclusive control of the cable operator." Midwest I, 406 U.S. at 653 n.6 
(citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.5(w». 
80. CABLE TELEVISION INFoRMATION CENTER, THE USES OF CABLE COMMUNICATIONS 
9 (1973) (hereinafter USES OF CABLE). As of 1981, about 3,080 cable systems cable-
casted programs. BROADCASTING/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981). 
81. USES OF CABLE, supra note 80, at 9. 
82. Id. 
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2. Pay Television. From 1972 on, pay television has offered 
cable television stations a means to fill unused channels, at-
tract more subscribers, and sell more services to existing sub-
scribers. Generally, cable systems lease a channel to one of 
the pay networks in exchange for royalties based on the 
number of subscribers who sign up for the additional charge.83 
What the subscribers usually receive are recent movies, sports, 
and some programming produced by the pay network itself.84 
Pay television has proved to be extremely popular. In 1980, 
over 8 million households had pay television;85 it is estimated 
that by 1985 there will be between 16 million and 25 million pay 
television subscribers.86 As the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit has said, "The popularity of this medium has 
grown so rapidly that it is not impossible that, by the end of the 
century, it. will be the prime method for viewing motion 
pictures. "87 
3. Public Access. With more channels available on a cable 
television system than were needed to carry local and distant 
television broadcast signals, interest turned toward the utiliza-
tion of some of the excess channels to present programming by 
those not affiliated with the cable television company, broad-
cast television systems, or other traditional program produ-
cers. The concept of "public access" channels, to be available 
on a "first-come, first-served" basis to anyone in the commu-
nity served by the cable television company,88 was seen as one 
of the greatest advantages which the new cable technology 
83. For example, cable systems pay Home Box Office, the largest program produ-
cer, four dollars a month for every H.B.O. subscriber plus a percentage of any amount 
above seven dollars the system charges the subscriber for the pay service. January 
Date Set/or HBO Rate Hike, CABLEVISION, July 13,1981, at 33. Suppliers of basic pro-
gramming service, that for which the cable operator does not charge subscribers an 
extra fee, charge the operator 5¢-15¢ per subscriber per month. See Howard, Satisfying 
Cable's Vast Appetite/or Programming, DUN'S BUSINESS MONTH, Nov. 1981, at 84. 
84. The rates subscribers are charged for pay services are unregulated. The Fed-
eral Communications Commission has both declined to regulate rates and prohibited 
states from imposing such regulation. See Notice of Inquiry in Docket 20767, 58 
F.C.C.2d 915 (1976), upheld in Brookhaven Cable TV v. Kelly, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 
1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979). 
85. Columbia Pictures, 507 F. Supp. at 416. 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 415. 
88. For a description of how a public access system can be established, see W. 
BAER, supra note 19, at 134-37; Buske, Improving Local Community Access Program-
ming, PuBLIC MANAGEMENT, June, 1980, at 12-14. 
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could offer.89 
In 1971, the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications is-
sued a report on the development of cable television.90 One of 
the Commission's recommendations was the establishment of 
public access channels.91 The Commission saw public access 
as a means through which individual members of a community 
could communicate with the community at large: 
There is a need, in every community, for the expression of 
common notions, for the expression of artistic and cultural en-
deavors; a need to serve the elderly, the deaf, the very young; a 
need for an audience that finds a resolution in more affluent 
areas, in the creation of Little Theater Groups and similar as-
sociations. There is the need to express oneself in forms that 
can be carried across boundaries to similar communities else-
where, and indeed to dissimilar communities which might 
profit from the expression of unfamiliar views. There is a per-
vasive need, in short, to be heard.92 
The Cabinet Committee on Cable Television's Report to The 
President in 1974 also endorsed the idea of public access chan-
nels.93 The Cabinet Committee regarded access as essential if 
cable television was to be a "constructive force in our national 
life ":94 
We believe that cable development has the potential of creat-
ing an electronic medium of communications more diverse, 
more pluralistic, and more open, more like the print and film 
media than our present broadcast system. It could provide mi-
nority groups, ethnic groups, the aged, the young, or people liv-
ing in the same neighborhood an opportunity to express, and to 
see expressed, their own views. Yet it would also enable all of 
these groups to be exposed to the views of others, free of the 
homogeneity which characterizes contemporary television pro-
gramming. Cable offers countless Americans a chance to 
speak for themselves and among themselves in their own way, 
and a chance to share with one another their experiences, their 
89. See, e.g., W. BAER, supra note 19, at 137; Barnette, State, Federal and Local 
Regulation o/Cable Television, 47 NOTRE DAME LAw. 685, 737-38, 789-92 (1972); Bazelon, 
The First Amendment and the "New Media"-New Directions in Regulating Telecom-
munications, 31 F.C.C. L.J. 201, 210 (1979); Botein, Access to Cable Television, 57 CORN. 
L. REV. 414, 438 (1972); Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1008, 1035-37 (1971). 
90. SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50. 
91. [d. at 125. 
92. [d. at 124-25. 
93. Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 44 n.9. 
94. [d. at 19. 
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opinions, their frustrations, and their hopes. Rather than in-
crease the alienation of individual from individual and group 
from group, cable could combine the shared experience of na-
tional television with a type of active participation in the polit-
ical and social process that was· common in the days before 
urbanization eroded the opportunity for personal involvement 
in events that affected the community.95 
It is this potential for personal involvement within each com-
munity that makes public access particularly important. Not 
only can local town meetings be broadcast throughout the com-
munity, but individuals and groups can comment on and re-
spond to the issues addressed by the local governing body.96 In 
fact, public access permits the raising of issues which other-
wise would not be discussed in the local media at all.97 
In addition to the opportunity to increase discussion of polit-
ical issues, public access provides a medium for offering impor-
tant services to narrow audiences, too small to be served by 
current mass electronic media. Some examples of such pro-
gramming include shows in sign language for the deaf, pro-
gramming for the elderly, and religious programming.98 
7. 
95. Id. at 15. 
96. See Bell, A Different Kind o/Television, PuBLIC MANAGEMENT, June, 1980, at 5-
97. See W. BAER, supra note 19, at 2: 
Citizens may speak on any subject they choose. After using portable cameras, 
all sorts of groups-churches, Boy Scouts, minority groups, high school 
classes, crusaders for causes-can create and show their own programs. With 
public access, cable can become a medium for local action instead of a distrib-
utor of pre-packaged mass consumption programs to a passive audience. 
98. See O'Connor, Reviews 0/ Major Cable Services Available in the Tri-State Area, 
N.Y. Times, July 12, 1981 , 2, at 25, col. 1: 
The variety of access fare in Manhattan verges on the bewildering. In the past 
few weeks, the persistent browser could have visited a black Baptist church in 
Brooklyn, a Jewish Passover seder, and a small Roman Catholic seminar on 
the subject of "Future Wars in the Secrets of Dogma." These represented only 
a fraction of the religious programming. For balance of a sort, there was the 
"American Atheist New Forum," featuring the always militant Madelyn Mur-
ray O'Hare, who was claiming to detect "an extraordinary curiousity about 
atheism out there." Elsewhere, there were yoga lessons with a lot of inhaling 
and exhaling, weight-control lectures (''the 4 S's of a gluttonous fat person are 
silver, slice, slab, and slob"), and a number of psychics, including one who 
recently used tarot cards to conclude that a gentleman on the telephone was 
''very concerned with money." 
Access can be serious. "Communications Update" recently offered a report on 
the Woodhull Medical Center in Brooklyn and the reasons for its still post-
pone opening. On "Building for Tomorrow," a group of black persons dis-
cussed the weapon of rent strikes. 
Other cities and systems may offer more uplifting, more purely informational 
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D. The Federal Communications Commission Access Rules 
In May, 1976, the Federal Communications Commission 
promulgated rules mandating that cable television systems 
with over 3,500 subscribers make available channels for various 
types of access programming.99 The rules required cable com-
panies to provide from their available channels a public access 
channel, an education access channel, a local government ac-
cess channel and a leased access channel. 100 If there was not 
sufficient demand by programmers for all of those channels, 
cable operators were permitted to combine one or more chan-
nels.lOl Sufficient demand was defined as access channel use, 
"80 percent of the weekdays (Monday-Friday) for 80% of the 
time during any consecutive three-hour period for six consecu-
tive weeks .... "102 
The number of available channels in a cable television sys-
tem was to be calculated by subtracting from the total number 
of channels the number of channels carrying television broad-
cast signals and already carrying pay programming.l03 Chan-
nels being used for local origination which were offered to 
subscribers at no change were deemed to be "available" for ac-
cess.104 The rules also prohibited a cable television company 
from using a channel which was currently available for access 
to provide new pay programming. lOS 
The public access channel was required to be made available 
for service on a first-come first-served, nondiscriminatory ba-
sis. l06 Apart from enforcement of the Commission's prohibi-
tion against advertising and obscene or indecent programming, 
there was to be no control by the cable television operator of 
the content of the programs on the access channel.107 There 
forms of access content, but somehow the crazy, unpredictable mix to be 
found in Manhattan manages to capture a fairly accurate reflection of the 
area's perhaps unique diversity. 
See also USES OF CABLE, supra note 80, at 22. 
99. These rules appear in Report and Order, Docket 20508, 59 F.C.C.2d 294 (1976) 
(hereinafter 1976 Report) and were deleted in 45 Fed. Reg. 76, 178 (1980) pursuant to 
the Supreme Court's ruling in Midwest II, see text accompanying notes 123-26 i7ifra. 
100. See 1976 Report, supra note 99, at 327 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.254(a) (1976». 
101. See id. at 327-28 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.254(b) (1976». 
102. [d. at 328 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.254(d) (1976». 
103.· See id. at 315. 
104. See id. at 315-16. 
105. See id. at 316-17. 
106. See id. at 328 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.256(d) (1976». 
107. See id. at 328 (citing 47 C.F.R § 76.256(b) (1976». 
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was to be at least one public access channel for use without 
charge. 
In addition to providing the channel for access programming, 
the cable television company also had to provide a studio with 
"some inhouse capacity for members of the public to record 
programming .... "108 The cable company was permitted to 
make reasonable charges for equipment and production of the 
public access programs, but in no instance was a charge per-
mitted for live public access programming if less than five min-
utes in length.l09 
The Commission concluded that while there were both di-
rect costs and opportunity costs associated with the provision 
of access channels, these costs were outweighed by the public 
benefits.l1O The access channels, if used properly, would: 
result in the opening of new outlets for local expression, aid in 
the promotion of diversity in television programming, act in 
some measure to restore a sense of community to cable sub-
scribers and a sense of openness and participation to the video 
medium, aid in the functioning of democratic institutions, and 
improve the informational and educational communications re-
sources of cable television communities. III 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined the 
constitutionality of the public access requirements in Midwest 
Video Corporation v. FCC .112 While striking down the rules as 
beyond the F.C.C.'s jurisdiction, the court said that, "Were it 
. necessary to decide the issue, the present record would render 
the intrusion by the present rules constitutionally 
impermissible. "113 
The court held that cablecasting was communication pro-
tected by the First Amendment freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press clauses.1l4 Specifically, the court found no 
distinction between cable systems and newspapers in deter-
mining the government's power to require public access.1l5 Re-
lying on Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,1l6 the court 
108. [d. at 317, 328 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(a) (3) (1976». 
109. See id. at 328 (citing 47 C.F.R. § 76.256(c)(3) (1976». 
110. See id. at 296. 
111. [d. 
112. 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), ajf'd, 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
113. [d. at 1056. 
114. [d. at 1054 & n.70. 
115. [d. at 1056. 
116. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
No.1] PUBLIC ACCESS REQUffiEMENTS 17 
ruled that public access rules impermissibly require cable op-
erators "who have invested substantially to create a private 
electronic 'publication'-a means of disseminating informa-
tion-, to open their 'publications' to all for use as they 
wish."u7 The Commission's access rules were condemned be-
cause they removed all editorial discretion from the cable sys-
tem owner both as to who could use the system and what 
programming material was shown. us 
The court stated that even though there may be only one 
cable company in a community, such scarcity would not war-
rant the access requirements. Again relying on Tornillo, the 
court said, 
[Scarcity] which is the result solely of economic conditions is 
apparently insufficient to justify even limited government in-
trusion into the First Amendment rights of the conventional 
press, . . . and there is nothing in the record before us to sug-
gest a constitutional distinction between cable television and 
newspapers on this point.u9 
The Federal Communications Commission was also faulted 
for failing to decide whether cable systems are public fo-
rums.120 If the systems were not public forums, the court said, 
it would appear that access requirements would be unconstitu-
tional: "Every individual's right to speak, precious and para-
mount as it is, does not include every individual's right to be 
given the possibility of an audience by government fiat, or to 
speak in a non-pUblic forum like a newspaper, a magazine, or 
on the Senate fioor."121 
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision 
voiding the public access rules, but based its holding entirely 
on a finding that the rules exceeded the Commission's jurisdic-
tion.122 The Court said that public access requirements im-
posed common carrier obligations on cable operators.123 The 
117. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d at 1056. (emphasis in original). 
118. See id. at 1055. 
119. Id. (quoting Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 46) (citations omitted). 
120. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d at 1054. 
121. Id. The court also criticized the F.C.C. for not explaining why compelled access 
to cable facilities differed, in terms of First Amendment analysis, from compelled ac-
cess to broadcast facilities. Id. at 1055. The court did not explain, however; either the 
relevance of the comparison or whether, in fact, compelled access to broadcast facili-
ties would be per se unconstitutional. Cj. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 114, 101 S. Ct. 2813 
(1981) (federal candidates have enforceable right of access to broadcast stations). 
122. See 440 U.S. 689 (1979). 
123. See id. at 700-702. 
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Communications Act of 1934,124 the Court held, barred the 
Commission from compelling broadcasters, including cable op-
erators, to act as common carriers, even for only a portion of 
their total services.125 
In reaching its decision, the Court did not discuss the merits 
of the Eighth Circuit First Amendment analysis. In a footnote, 
the Court said: "The court below suggested that the Commis-
sion's rules might violate the First Amendment rights of cable 
operators. Because our decision rests on statutory grounds, 
we express no view on that question, save to acknowledge that 
it is not frivolous and to make clear that the asserted constitu-
tional issue did not determine or sharply influence our con-
struction of the statute."126 
F. The Eighth Circuit's Mis-Analysis 
The Eighth Circuit's analysis of the constitutionality of pub-
lic access requirements for cable television systems was based 
on a misreading of Tornillo and a simplistic interpretation of 
First Amendment law. By relying solely on a decision concern-
ing access to newspapers, the court violated the admonition 
given by Justice Stewart in a different access case, Columbia 
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee: 
"The problem before us. . . is too complex to admit of solution 
by simply analogizing to cases in very different areas."127 
The fundamental error made by the Eighth Circuit was in 
assuming that the rules governing the constitutionality of man-
dated access to newspapers applied a fortiori to public access 
on cable television. It is a settled principle of constitutional 
analysis that each medium of expression presents its own spe-
cial First Amendment problems.128 Newspapers,129 movies,130 
television,131 radio,132 and billboards133 each require a separate 
124. 47 U.S.C. § 153(h). 
125. See Midwest II, 440 U.S. at 705 & n.15. 
126. [d. at 709 n.19. 
127. 412 U.S. 94, 134 (1973) (concurring opinion). 
128. See Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 
U.S. 726, 748 (1978); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557, (1975) 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S., 367, 386. 
129. See Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-58. 
130. See Burnstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. at 503. In 1915, in fact, the Supreme Court 
ruled that movies were merely, "spectacles, not to be regarded ... as part of the press 
of the country or as organs of public opinion." Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Com-
mission of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 245 (1915). 
131. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 386. 
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and distinct set of First Amendment rules. While prior review 
by a government agency of movies might be constitutional,134 
such review of books is blatantly unconstitutional.135 Although 
the First Amendment prevents newspaper publishers from be-
ing forced to print the replies of political candidates they criti-
cize,136 it permits a requirement that those who control 
television channels provide equal time to the· candidates they 
criticize.137 As Justice White stated in Metromedia, Inc. v. City 
of San Diego :138 "Each method of communicating ideas is 'a 
law unto itself and that law must reflect the 'differing natures, 
values, abuses and dangers' of each method."139 
When the Supreme Court in Tornillo unanimously struck 
down the Florida law which required a newspaper to print the 
responses of political candidates to its attacks, the Court did 
not condemn all access requirements per se, but relied on the 
special history and characteristics of newspapers as a form of 
communication.l40 Indeed, the Court did not even mention its 
decision only five years earlier in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. 
FCC,141 which rejected a challenge to the equal time rules to 
which television broadcasters are subject. Justice White made 
clear in his concurrence in Tornillo that the blanket prohibi-
tion against access requirements is limited to newspapers: 
"According to our accepted jurisprudence, the First Amend-
ment erects a virtually insurmountable bamer between gov-
ernment and the print media so far as government tampering, 
in advance of publication, with news and editorial content is 
132. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). 
133. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). 
134. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) (struck down law requiring prior 
review of movies because it did not provide for a Sufficiently speedy review; Times 
Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (ordinance requiring prior review of 
films is not per se unconstitutional). 
135. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963). The Court distinguished 
Bantam Books from its Times Film decision by saying, "Furthermore, the holding was 
expressly confined to motion pictures." [d. at 70 n.10. 
136. See Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
137. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
138. 453 U.S. 490 101, S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (Justice White wrote the opinion for a four-
pel'Son plurality, striking down a city ban on some commercial and all noncommercial 
advertising on billboards). 
139. [d. at 2889. (quoting Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Kovacs v. Cooper, 
336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949». Justice Stevens joined this part of the plurality opinion, 101 S. 
Ct. at 2909; accordingly a majority of the Court supported this statement. 
140. Miami Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-58. See text accompanying 
notes 157-158, infra. 
141. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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concerned.,,142 
The Supreme Court specifically refused to extend its 
Tornillo ruling to all access cases in Pruneyard Shopping 
Center v. Robins.143 That case upheld a California constitu-
tional provision which permitted individuals to exercise free 
speech and petition rights in a privately owned shopping 
center. The Court rejected the argument that Tornillo com-
pelled a holding that the First Amendment rights of the owners 
of the shopping center were violated when the state required 
them to permit those with whom they disagreed to use their 
property as a pulpit: 
[Tornillo] rests on the principle that the State cannot tell a 
newspaper what it must print. The Florida statute contravened 
this principle in that it, "enact [ ed] a penalty on the basis of the 
content of a newspaper." There was also a danger in Tornillo 
that the statute would "damp [en] the vigor and [limit] the va-
riety of public debate" by deterring editors from publishing 
controversial political statements that might trigger the appli-
cation of the statute. Thus, the statute was found to be an "in-
trusion into the function of editors." These concerns obviously 
are not present here.l44 
Those concerns also do not apply to cable television access 
rules. In requiring that a cable system set aside a separate 
channel for those who wish to publicize their views, there is no 
"penalty" assessed against the cable operator because of the 
content of any other programming shown on the cable system. 
Similarly, there is no danger that an access requirement will 
impair either the vigor or variety of debate on cable television 
since the requirement is not dependent on the cable operator 
exhibiting controversial programming. 
To apply the holding in Tornillo to any question concerning 
cable television is particularly inapposite in light of the dispos-
itive statement made at the end of that decision: 
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply 
with a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo 
publication of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the 
Florida statute fails to clear the barriers of the First Amend-
ment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. A 
newspaper is more than a passive receptable or conduit for 
news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to go 
142. 418 U.S. at 259 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
143. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
144. [d. at 88 (citations omitted). 
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into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on 
the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public is-
sues and public officials-whether fair or unfair--constitute 
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be 
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial pro-
cess can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guar-
antees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.145 
21 
While a newspaper is not a ''passive receptacle or conduit," 
the Supreme Court has ruled that a cable television system, at 
least in regard to its carriage of television broadcast signals, is 
a "nonperformer"l46 and a ''passive beneficiary."147 In Fort-
nightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 148 the Court 
held that a cable television system did not infringe the copy-
right of movie producers whose films it transmitted to its sub-
scribers when it carried a local television broadcast channel. 
The Court said that, unlike broadcasters who select the pro-
grams to be seen on their channels, cable television systems 
"simply carry, without editing, whatever programs they re-
ceive."149 Therefore, the Court concluded, cable television op-
erators, "like viewers and unlike broadcasters, do not perform 
the programs that they receive and carry."150 
The Court affirmed the essentially passive role of cable tele-
vision systems in Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcast 
System, Inc. 151 In Teleprompter, creators and producers of 
copyrighted television programs argued that cable television 
operators became active performers when the operators de-
cided which distant channels to carry and when the operators 
offered their own programming in addition to local broadcast 
signals. The Court rejected both arguments. The Court held 
that, 
Even in exercising its limited freedom to choose among various 
broadcasting stations, a CATV operator simply cannot be 
viewed as 'selecting,' 'procuring,' and 'propagating' broadcast 
signals ... An operator of a CATV system ... makes a choice 
as to which broadcast signals to rechannel to its subscribers, 
and its creative function is then extinguished.152 
145. 418 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added). 
146. Teleprompter CorP. v. CBS, Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 409 (1974). 
147. Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artist Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399 (1968). 
148. 392 U.S. 390 (1968). 
149. [d. at 400. 
150. [d. at 400-01. 
151. 415 U.S. 394 (1974). 
152. [d. at 410. 
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The Court held that the fact that a cable television operator 
produces and displays its own programming also does not 
transform the operator into a "performer" for the other pro-
grams it offers. Even though the operator-produced program-
ming was sold as a package with the carriage of local broadcast 
signals, "they remain separate and different operations, and we 
cannot sensibly say that the system becomes a 'performer' of 
the broadcast programming when it offers both origination and 
reception services, but remains a nonperformer when it offers 
only the latter."153 
The Eighth Circuit also misinterpreted the Tornillo deci-
sion's holding as to the effect of "economic" scarcity rather 
than "physical" scarcity on First Amendment rights. The court 
stated that Tornillo held that scarcity resulting solely from eco-
nomic conditions is insufficient to justify even limited govern-
ment intrusion into the First Amendment rights of the 
"conventional press" and that cable television and newspapers 
were constitutionally indistinguishable on this point.154 
The Tornillo decision, however, did not enunciate a constitu-
tional ruling of the irrelevance of economic scarcity. Rather, 
the Court held that the fact that economic conditions caused 
"newspaper monopolies"155 to exist in many cities did not alter 
the First Amendment rights of newspapers: "If it is govern-
mental coercion, this at once brings about a confrontation with 
the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial 
gloss on that Amendment developed over the years."156 In 
153. [d. at 405 (quoting the lower court opinion, 476 F.2d 338, 347 (2nd Cir. 1973». In 
Midwest II, the Supreme Court stated: 
Cable operators now share with broadcasters a significant amount of editorial 
discretion regarding what their programming will include. As the Commis-
sion, itself, has observed, "both in their signal carriage decisions and in con-
nection with their origination function, cable television systems are afforded 
considerable control over the content of the programming they provide." Re-
port and Order in Docket No. 20829, 43 Fed. Reg. 53742 (1978). 
440 U.S. at 707. The Court added that the discretion exercised by cable operators was 
not necessarily coextensive with that of broadcasters: "We do not suggest, nor do we 
find it necessary to conclude, that the discretion exercised by cable operators is of the 
same magnitude as that enjoyed by broadcasters." [d. at 707 n.17. 
The Court in Midwest II did not reject the holdings in Fortnightly and Teleprompter; 
in fact, the Court did not even mention those decisions. Cable television, then, may be 
said to display traits in common with both passive and active media. Accordingly, the 
holding in Tornillo, based on the self-evident non-passive nature of newspapers, can-
not apply ipso facto to cable television systems. 
154. 571 F.2d at 1055. See text accompanying note 120, supra. 
155. 418 U.S. at 253. 
156. [d. at 254. 
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describing the "judicial gloss;" the Court limited its discussion, 
in large part, to cases detailing the First Amendment rights of 
newspapers, not of all media in general.I57 
That economic scarcity can indeed be a factor in determining 
the permissible range of government regulation of a medium of 
communication was indicated by the Supreme Court in its Red 
Lion decision. In discussing the scarcity of the airwaves, the 
Court acknowledged that occasionally various wavelengths are 
left unused.I5s The Court held that this did not negate the gov-
ernmental interest in regulating the broadcast media: "The 
substantial capital investment required for many uses, in addi-
tion to the potentiality for confusion and interference inherent 
in any scheme for continuous kaleidoscopic reallocation of all 
available space may make this unfeasible."159 
The Court also held that the fact that existing stations could 
conceivably face direct competition by a new station did not 
prevent the government from requiring a broadcaster to give 
equal time to opposing viewpoints. The Court stated that the 
existing stations would have a "substantial advantage" over a 
new station, including confirmed habits of listeners and view-
ers, network affiliation, and greater experience in broadcast-
ing.I60 Because these advantages were "the fruit of a preferred 
position conferred by the Government," the Court said the pos-
sibility of competition by new stations was insufficient "to 
render unconstitutional the Government's effort to assure that 
a broadcaster's programming ranges widely enough to serve 
157. Id. at 254-57. The cases which the Court cited as creating this "judicial gloss" 
were: Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (which held that antitrust 
laws apply to newspapers); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (which held that 
the First Amendment does not give a newspaper reporter immunity from a grand jury 
subpoena); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 
U.S. 376 (1973) (which prohibited the use of discriminatory classified advertising in a 
newspaper); Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(which held that a newspaper cannot be forced to publish an advertisement without 
editorial control); and Grosjean v. American Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (which prohibited 
a tax on the gross receipts of newspapers with a large circulation). The only other 
cases cited were CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) 
(which was cited for its position, "strongly adverse to any attempt to extend a right of 
access to newspapers," 418 U.S. at 255; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964) (which was cited for its condemnation of government action which decreases 
the energy and variety of public debate); and Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) 
(which was cited for its statement that a major purpose of the First Amendment was to 
protect discussion of governmental affairs in general, candidates in particular). 
158. 395 U.S. at 398-400. 
159. Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added). 
160. Id. at 400. 
24 COMM/ENT [Vol. 4 
the public interest."161 
The precise effect on First Amendment rights of different 
media due to scarcity caused by economic factors remains un-
decided. Nonetheless, it is incorrect to say that economic reali-
ties can never be considered in determining the 
constitutionality of a governmental attempt to ''preserve an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately 
prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that 
market."162 . 
The final error the Eighth Circuit made in its analysis of the 
constitutionality of the cable access rules was its arbitrary 
statement that unless cable systems were deemed to be "pub-
lic forums" the rules could not pass constitutional muster.163 
While the Eighth Circuit was correct in its view that the First 
Amendment does not give every individual the right to use any 
private property or means of communication belonging to 
someone else without the owner's permission,164 it was incor-
rect to assume that all access decisions must rest on a determi-
nation of whether or not a medium is a ''public forum." In 
deciding the constitutionality of access requirements to radio 
and television, for example, the Supreme Court has utilized an 
entirely different categorization. Certain types of access may 
be permitted, the Court has held, because those who control 
those scarce frequencies are "proxies"165 and "fiduciaries,,166 
for the entire community: "A license permits broadcasting, but 
the licensee has no constitutional right to. . . monopolize a ra-
dio frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens."167 
II 
The First Amendment Characteristics of 
Cablecasting 
Before beginning an analysis of whether access require-
ments infringe the First Amendment rights of cable television 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 390. 
163. See 571 F.2d at 1054. 
164. See United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 
453 U.S. 114, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981) (mailbox not a public forum); Lloyd v. Tanner, 407 
U.S. 551 (1972) (private shopping center not a public forum). 
165. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. at 394. 
166. Id. at 389. 
167. Id. See Columbia Broadcasting Systems v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 101 S. Ct. 2813, 
2829 (1981). 
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operators,168 it would be useful to determine the nature of 
those rights and whether they are coextensive with the rights 
of either of two media whose rights have been fairly well delin-
eated by the Supreme Court: newspapers and television. How-
ever, while such a determination may help clarify the nature of 
the issue in question, it will not resolve the issue. 
Some courts have specifically held that cable television is a 
speaker protected by the First Amendment.16g The California 
Supreme Court ruled that a total ban on pay subscription tele-
vision was an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom of ex-
pression.170 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia held that rules limiting the type and amount of pay 
programming on cable television violated cablecasters' First 
Amendment rights. l7l 
Though cable television operators are undoubtedly involved 
in communications and thereby fall under the umbrella of the 
First Amendment,172 the relationship of the cable operator to 
the programs that are carried complicates the question of 
whether "cablecasting" is speech. In Teleprompter, the 
Supreme Court recognized the fundamental difference be-
tween different types of programming carried over the cables. 
The Court stated that while it was "undisputed" that cable tel-
evision operators who originate their own programming "per-
form" that programming, the same cable operators are 
nonperformers of the off-the-air programming they receive 
from broadcasters.173 The variation in the control held by the 
cable television operator over the different channels was ac-
knowledged by the Court in Midwest II: "A cable system may 
operate as a common carrier ... vith respect to a portion of its 
168. The First Amendment guarantee for free speech is made applicable to the 
states by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. Conrad, 
420 U.S. 546, 547; Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
169. See, e.g., Weaverv. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 242, 411 P.2d 289, 294, cert. denied, 385 
U.S. 844 (1966); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46; Boulder II, 496 F. Supp. at 
828. 
170. Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d at 249, 411 P.2d at 299. 
171. H.B.O., 567 F.2d at 49-50. 
172. Cable television operators do not lose their first amendment rights either be-
cause they are regulated by the government, Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv-
ice Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.l (1980), they exhibit, in large part, entertainment 
programming, Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 101 S. Ct. 2176, 2181 
(1981), or their communication requires a great expenditure of money, Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). 
173. 415 U.S. at 404-05. 
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service only."174 
Cable television performs many different functions and 
there may be different constitutional protections for each of 
those different functions. A cable television operator who pro-
duces and exhibits his own programming is certainly entitled 
to the same protection as any other producer of programming. 
However, it is the cable operator's capacity as producer which 
is the source of that protection. It is the cable operator's role 
as distributor of programming which has yet to be defined.175 
A. Neither Newspaper Nor Broadcast Television 
Newspapers and television broadcasters are both "distribu-
tors" of information, yet they are afforded quite different pro-
tection by the First Amendment. Although they have much in 
common, they are not in the same category in terms of the obli-
gations imposed, or which could be imposed, by law.176 Cable 
television possesses attributes which can be categorized as 
similar on the one hand to a newspaper, and on the other hand 
to a television broadcaster. However, neither analogy is com-
plete enough to permit a wholesale transposition of constitu-
tional protection of either medium to cable television. 
Cable television shares with newspapers a capacity for 
presenting a wide variety of information and issues simultane-
ously.l77 Unlike traditional television broadcasters, a cable tel-
evision operator has numerous channels at his disposal,178 
Like a newspaper, a cable television operator can present in-
formation of interest to relatively small sections of the. popula-
tion and not compel one subgroup to endure a discussion of a 
174. 440 U.S. at 701 n.9. See National Association of Regulatory Utility Commission-
ers v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
175. "[W)e have said that in our view cable systems 'are neither broadcasters nor 
common carriers within the meaning of the Communications Act' but rather that 
'cable is a hybrid that receives identification and regulation as a separate force in com-
munications.''' 1976 Report, supra note 99, at 299. 
176. See Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 359 F.2d 
994, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See generally Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public 
Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 
36 (1976) (this article took the position that the differing First Amendment protections 
furthered two distinct First Amendment goals: "a,ccess in a highly concentrated press 
and minimal governmental intervention."). 
177. See generally Note, supra note 12, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 146-47. See also Boulder 
II, 496 F. Supp. at 829-30. 
178. See text accompanying note 78, supra. 
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matter of concern only to a different groUp.179 Newspaper read-
ers can turn the page to a different article; cable subscribers 
can switch the channel. 180 
Cable television and newspapers are also not subject to the 
same physical limitation of the airwaves as are television and 
radio broadcasters. Government regulation originally was im-
posed on radio broadcasters because unregulated use of fre-
quencies caused intolerable interference: "With everybody on 
the air, nobody could be heard."18l In contrast, the cables of a 
cable television distribution system are either strung on poles 
or placed in the ground, and two cables can lie side-by-side 
without causing the same type of interference.182 
However, there are important differences between cable tele-
vision and newspapers which will affect the nature of the con-
stitutional protection each medium is afforded. For example, 
cable television systems are not as "unlimited" as newspapers. 
First, there is a limit as to how many times a municipality will 
want its streets torn Up,183 and a limit as to how many cables a 
telephone pole will hold.184 Second, because of its economic 
and technological structure, cable television may be inherently 
oligopolistic.185 Finally, there is the enormous difference in 
cost of production.186 Newspapers constitute just one segment 
of the written media; pamphlets, leaflets, and fliers can all be 
179. See SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 43-44. 
180. See id. 
181. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 212 (1943). 
182. See Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1038. 
183. Even if overground cables are strung, there can be great difficulty with having 
more than one cable company. The town of East Greenbush, N.Y. awarded directly 
competing franchises to two cable television companies. The commencement of serv-
ice was delayed while the companies tried to agree on the logistics of their wirings. 
Additionally, the use of two cables, rather than one, required that several utility poles 
be replaced. Cable Competition Failing to Hasten Service in E.G., Greenbush Area 
News, March 16, '1977, at 1, col. 1. Today, there is only one cable company operating in 
East Greenbush, see New York State Commission on Cable Television, supra note 18, 
at 245. 
184. The most commonly used poles are 35-40 feet long with a usable space of 11-16 
feet. Cables use one foot of pole space and there must be at least 40 inches of "safety 
space" between the electric lines and the communications cable. See Adoption of 
Rulesfor the Regulation of Cable Television Pole Attachments, Docket 78-144, Memo-
randum Opinion and Second Report and Order, 72 F.C.C.2d 59, 68-70 (1979); Gillespie, 
Pole Attachments: Still Listening For Joshua, CABLEVISION, July 27, 1981 at 65. See also 
Boulder I, 485 F. Supp. at 1038. . 
185. See text accompanying notes 50-70, supra. 
186. SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 45-46. 
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produced without great expense.187 While there may be only 
one general circulation newspaper in a city, there are numer-
ous weekly newspapers, special interest newspapers, and 
magazines and journals available in the same city to compete 
with the newspaper.188 Ownership of a cable television system, 
though, is out of reach of all but the wealthiest.189 There is 
nothing in the cable television field comparable to the maga-
zine or pamphlet.190 While a program could be produced as 
inexpensively as a small publication, the distribution system is 
available to only a few. Journals can be mailed to subscribers 
for a few cents each. A cable program can only be distributed 
through an integrated cable system. 
Another fundamental difference between cable television 
and newspapers is their relationship with the municipalities in 
which they operate.19l Because cable systems must use public 
streets, they must receive governmental approval before they 
begin to communicate with the public.192 Thus they are in-
volved with government in a way in which newspapers are 
not.193 By awarding only one franchise, or even by awarding a 
limited number of franchises, the government is protecting the 
cable company from competition.194 The newspaper does not 
need official approval to publish, and must survive or perish in 
the open marketplace. Cable companies cannot cease service 
or transfer ownership unless permitted to do so by the local 
governing body.195 With the exception of restrictions placed by 
antitrust laws,196 newspapers are generally permitted to con-
duct business as they please. In short, cable television has a 
187. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082, 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
842 (1970). 
188. In 1974, when the Supreme Court in Tornillo discussed the problem of a news-
paper monopoly in Miami, 418 U.S. at 248-50, there were three daily newspapers in the 
city in addition to the Miami Herald (the News, Review, and Diario Las Americas), 18 
weekly, bi-weekly, or tri-weekly newspapers, and 24 monthly publications. See N.W. 
AYER DIRECTORY OF PuBLICATIONS, 240-42 (1974). 
189. See text accompanying notes 28-38, supra. 
190. SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50 at 93. 
191. Boulder II, 7 Media L. Rptr. at 1999. 
192. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-331(a) (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
26, § 601(a) (1980); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2006 (Supp. 1975); VT. STAT. AJ'iN. tit. 30, 
§ 503(a) (Supp. 1981). 
193. Boulder II, 7 Media L. Rptr. at 1998. 
194. Boulder II, 496 F. Supp. at 829. 
195. See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 26, § 609(A) (1980); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 
166A § 7 (West, Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5A~43 (West Supp. 1980); N:Y. EXEC. 
LAw § 822 (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
196. See Associated Press, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
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history of regulation by the government; conversely, there is a 
"virtually insurmountable barrier" between government and 
newspapers.197 
A third distinction between cable television and newspapers 
is that cable television is intimately connected with that other 
heavily regulated medium-broadcast television.198 Cable tele-
vision arose in large part due to a public demand for improved 
television broadcast service,199 and cable systems use the 
broadcast signals as ''the backbone of the service they pro-
vide."2°O There is also an obvious facial similarity between 
cable and broadcast television. Cablecasted and broadcasted 
programs "look" the same and both are exhibited via the home 
television set.201 Additionally, both cable and broadcast televi-
sion share a relative scarcity of outlets in any given community 
and a resultant history of government regulation.202 
197. Tornillo, 418 u.s. at 259 (White, J., concurring). While the Court in Tornillo 
struck down a law requiring newspapers to publish that which, ''reason tells them 
should not be published," id. at 256, a Federal Communications Commission rule re-
quiring cable operators to carry, upon a broadcaster's request, local television signals 
whenever the cable operator imported competing signals has been found to be consti-
tutional, see Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65 (8th Cir. 1968) (cited approv-
ingly in Midwest 1,406 U.S. at 659 n.17 (plurality opinion». The Court in Midwest II 
distinguished the rule from an access requirement because the signal carriage rule, 
''was limited to remedying a specific perceived evil and thus involved a balance of con-
siderations not addressed by [the access rules ]." 440 U.S. at 706 n.16. This distinction, 
which led to a finding that the FCC lacked authority to promulgate the access rules, 
was based on a finding, not that access rules did not remedy any evil, but rather that 
these rules did not remedy an evil which the Commission had jurisdiction to combat. 
By contrast, the signal carriage rule, whose purpose was to prevent the impairment of 
service offered by television broadcasters, was ''reasonably ancillary" to the Commis-
sion's responsibilities for regulating broadcast television. Id. at 697. 
198. See Midwest 1,406 U.S. at 664-65. 
199. Id. at 665. See Second Report and Order, Docket 14895, 15233 and 15971, 2 
F.C.C.2d 725, 745 (1966). 
200. First Report and Order in Docket 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 222 (1969). 
20l. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), 
summary aJf'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
In upholding a ban on cigarette advertising on "any medium of electronic communica-
tion," the court said, "The unique characteristics of electronic communication make it . 
especially subject to regulation in the public interest." 
202. Compare NBC, 319 U.S. at 212 with text accompanying notes 50-70, supra. As 
Chief Justice (then Circuit Judge) Burger stated in OjJice of Communications of the 
United Church of Christ, 359 F.2d at 1003: 
The argument that a broadcaster is not a public utility is beside the point. 
True it is not a public utility in the same sense as strictly regulated common 
carriers or purveyors of power, but neither is it a purely private enterprise like 
a newspaper or an automobile agency. 
Similarly, cable television is not a "purely" private enterprise. See text accompanying 
notes 193-198, supra. 
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There are, however, numerous differences between the two 
media which may have constitutional significance. First, the 
interest of the federal government in regulating the airwaves is 
not identical to the interest of the municipal government in 
regulating its streets. The airwaves, used for communication, 
must be distributed so as to serve "the public interest.''203 A 
municipality has a more limited, or, in the words of one court, 
"parochial," interest in keeping its streets and alleyways open 
for travel by its inhabitants.204 
Second, the economics of the two media differ. Broadcast 
television operators have only one channel at their disposal 
and cannot appeal to specialized audiences; by appealing to 
minority tastes, the broadcaster risks losing the larger audi-
ence composed of many specialized, minority audiences.205 
But the cable operator, with several channels to program and 
with revenue directly tied to the number of subscribers, can 
offer a variety of programming: some "mainstream," and some 
with only a limited appeaI,206 Hence, the economics of cable tel-
evision can lead, at least in part, to greater diversity in pro-
gramming than occurs in broadcast television. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Home 
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC207 , in deliniating the difference between 
cable and broadcast television, stressed that cable television 
lacked the "physical interference and scarcity requiring an um-
piring role for government."208 The court stated there was not 
a problem of "physical scarcity of channels' relative to the 
number of persons who may seek access to the cable sys-
tem."209 The court also said that the only barrier to the number 
of cable operators was economic, as there was no ''readily ap-
parent barrier of physical or electrical interference to opera-
tion of a number of cable systems in a given locality."210 
It is incorrect to rely on the number of channels made avail-
203. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 101 S. Ct. at 2830. 
204. Boulder II, 496 F. Supp. 823, 828. 
205. See Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d at 1100 n.76. 
206. See Note, supra note 12, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. at 135-37. 
207. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
208. Id. at 45. 
209. Id. This was also the hope of Justice Douglas: "Scarcity may soon be a con-
straint of the past, thus obviating the concerns expressed in Red Lion. It has been 
predicted that it may be possible within 10 years to provide television viewers 400 
channels through the advances of cable television." CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National 
Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 158 n.8 (conCurring opinion). 
210. 567 F.2d at 46 (emphasis added). . 
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able by cable television to reach a conclusion that there is no 
problem with scarcity. If there is only one owner of all those 
channels, there is only one outlet for cable programming and 
only one operator deciding what will appear on cable 
television.211 
The court of appeals also erred when it found that because 
there is no physical obstacle to operation of "a number" of 
cable systems, the only cause of a cable television scarcity is 
economic. Even if a limited number, that is, in excess of one 
cable company, is theoretically possible in a town, that is quite 
different from the physically unlimited number of newspapers, 
magazines, and pamphlets that theoretically can be distributed 
in a locality.212 
The court was correct, though, in its recognition that the 
physical scarcity of broadcast television is of a different nature 
than that of cable television.213 That difference, along with the 
disparity in the type and amount of programming which can be 
offered on the two media, requires a distinct and separate anal-
ysis of First Amendment considerations for cable television. 
B. Public Access and First Amendment Interests 
The correct starting point for resolving the question of 
whether public access requirements for cable television sys-
te~s are constitutional can be found in a case which raised the 
question of the First Amendment rights of another untradi-
tional "speaker"----corporations. In First National Bank oj Bos-
ton v. Bellotti,214 the Supreme Court struck down as 
unconstitutional a Massachusetts law which prohibited corpo-
rations from making contributions or expenditures to influence 
the outcome of any election or referendum unless the referen-
dum "materially" affected the corporation's business or assets. 
The Court said that the lower court had incorrectly framed the 
principal question whether, and to what extent, corporations 
have First Amendment rights: 
The Constitution often protects interests broader than those of 
the party seeking their vindication. The First Amendment, in 
particular, serves significant societal interests. The proper 
211. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 
3 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI., 98, 107 (1972). . 
212. See text accompanying note 189, supra. 
213. See text accompanying n'otes 182-183, supra. 
214. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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question therefore is not whether corporations "have" First 
Amendment rights and, if so, whether they are coextensive 
with those of natural persons. Instead, the question must be 
whether [the law] abridges expression that the First Amend-
ment was meant to protect.215 
Similarly, the principal question for determining the consti-
tutionality of public access requirements is not whether cable 
television operators "have" First Amendment rights and, if so, 
whether they are coextensive with those of newspapers or 
broadcast television. Instead, the question must be whether 
public access requirements abridge expression that the First 
Amendment was meant to protect. 
One of the primary purposes of the First Amendment is "in-
formational"216-to provide that all citizens understand the is-
sues of the day so as to be fit to govern themselves under their 
own institutions.217 Professor Thomas 1. Emerson described 
freedom of expression as ''the best process for advancing 
knowledge and discovering truth."218 Accordingly, there is a 
"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on 
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open .... "219 
In order for the marketplace of ideas to function properly 
and for the free trade in thoughts and concepts to result in the 
attainment of truth,220 there must be available in the market-
place the full range of "goods," to wit, ideas. There is there~ore 
a corollary to the informational purpose, a First Amendment 
goal of achieving a diversity of vendors of ideas.221 As the 
215. [d. at 776. 
216. [d. at 782 n.18. 
217. [d. at 776. (speech about public issues "is at the herat of the First Amend-
ment's protection."); see Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 534 ("Freedom of speech 
is 'indispensible to the discovery and spread of political truth,' Whitney v. California, 
274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 14 
(1976) (''The First Amendment affords the broadest protection to such political expres-
sion in order 'to assure [the J unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of 
political and social changes desired by the people.' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 
484 (1957)"); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF GoVERNMENT 88-
89 (1948). 
218. T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRsT AMENDMENT 7 (1966). 
219. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
220. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
R. POSNER, supra note 52, at 308. 
221. See FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 795 
(1978); Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. I, 4 (1949) (''The right to speak freely and to 
promote diversity of ideas and programs is . . . one of the chief distinctions that sets 
us apart from totalitarian regimes."). 
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Supreme Court stated in Associated Press v. United States,222 
the First Amendment ''rests on the assumption that the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antag-
onistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public .... "223 
In Buckley v. Valeo, 224 the Court upheld the constitutionality 
of Subtitle H of the Internal Revenue Code which provided for 
public financing of presidential elections. The Court said that 
while government must remain absolutely neutral in matters 
of religion, even to the point that government may not aid all 
religions, this principle of nonintervention is not carried over 
in toto to matters of free speech.225 Subtitle H did not violate 
the First Amendment because it was an "effort, not to abridge, 
restrict, or censor speech, but rather to use public money to 
facilitate and enlarge public discussion and participation in 
the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people. 
Thus, Subtitle H furthers, not abridges, pertinent First Amend-
ment values.,,226 
Public access requirements for cable television systems 
serve to further the informational function of the First Amend-
ment.227 The marketplace of ideas is enhanced by the increase 
in the number of speakers and the variety of viewpoints they 
represent. As one commentator has pointed out: 
The public access channel, for the first time, guarantees the 
right of community participation at the individual level, even 
by individuals without organizational ties or portfolio. The 
range of possible programming is limited only by production 
costs. Thus, a wider spectrum of subjects than on any other 
cable channel is possible.228 
In Bellotti, the Court stated that "[the] individual's interest 
in self-expression is a concern of the First Amendment sepa-
rate from the concern for open and informed discussion, al-
222. 326 U.S. 1 (1945). 
223. Id. at 20. 
224. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
225. Id. at 92. 
226. Id. at 92-93 (emphasis added). 
227. See Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 19: 
If cable is to become a constructive force in our national life, it must be open to 
all Americans. There must be relatively easy access ... for those who wish to 
promote their ideas, state their views, or sell their goods and services. . . . 
This unfettered flow of information is central to freedom of speech and free-
dom of the press which have been described correctly as the freedoms upon 
which all of our other rights depend. 
228. USES OF CABLE, supra note 80, at 21. 
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though the two often converge."229 Professor Emerson has 
written that the right to freedom of expression is justified pri-
marily as a method of assuring individual self-fulfillment, and 
that this right is based on two fundamental principles: first, 
that it is the purpose of society and government to promote the 
welfare of the individual; and second, that it "is the principle of 
equality, formulated as the proposition that every individual is 
entitled to equal opportunity to share in common decisions 
which affect him."230 
To set aside one channel of a cable television system for pub-
lic access use by definition furthers the individual's interest in 
self-expression. It permits many individuals for the first time 
to communicate with their communities through television.231 
Public access fulfills the "pervasive need" to be heard. 
In addition to the individual's right to speak is the correlative 
right to receive information and ideas.232 The Supreme Court 
has ruled, "[f]reedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. 
But where a speaker exists ... the protection afforded is to the 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both."233 
The cable television subscriber's interest in receiving infor-
mation and ideas is advanced by the creation of a public access 
channel. Public access programming, since it is created by a 
broad cross-section of the community, can reflect community-
held interests and values.234 It creates an alternative to pro-
grams of more general interest which are offered on other 
cable channels. 
229. 435 U.S. at 777 n.12. Accord Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 534 n.2. Of 
course, this is not an unlimited right; the First Amendment does not provide " 'that 
people who want to propagandize their protests or views have a constitutional right to 
do so whenever and however they please.'" Council oj Greenburg Civic Associations, 
- U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2686-87 (quoting Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976) and 
Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 48 (1966». 
230. T. EMERSON, supra note 219, at 4-5. 
231. See W. BAER, supra note 19, at 134. 
232. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 
(1976). Accord CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2830; Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783; Linmark 
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977); Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762 (1972). 
233. Va. State Bd. oj Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756. 
234. See Bell, supra note 96, at 5; Bond, Regulation jor Access, PuBuc MANAGE-
MENT, June, 1980, at 19. The Supreme Court has stressed the importance of encourag-
ing communication on a local level, describing ''the heart of the natural right of the 
members of an organized society, united for their common good, to impart and acquire 
information about their common interests." Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233, 243 (1936). . 
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A final function served by the First Amendment guarantee of 
freedom of speech is that of protecting the peace within the 
community itself.235 The Supreme Court has recognized that 
the opportunity for free and open airing of contemporary is-
sues, "to the end that government may be responsive to the 
will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful 
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Repub-
lic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.,,236 
This theory of "social control" is premised on the principle 
that once all members of society have had the opportunity to 
express their positions on an issue and to attempt to persuade 
others to agree with them, those who fail to prevail on the issue 
will be more willing to accept the common judgment: 
They will recognize that they have been treated fairly, in ac-
cordance with rational rules for social living. They will feel 
that they have done all within their power, and will understand 
that the only remaining alternative is to abandon the ground 
rules altogether through resort to force, a course of action upon 
which most individuals in a healthy society are unwilling to 
embark. In many circumstances they will retain the opportu-
nity to try again and will hope in the end to persuade a major-
ity to their position.237 
The availability of a public access channel can further this 
goal and ease some of the tension that exists in many commu-
nities. Many people feel alienated from traditional broadcast 
television and believe that much, if not all, of the programming 
is unresponsive to their individual needs and the needs of their 
community.238 A public access channel permits community 
members to communicate effectively with one another.239 One 
observer explains that cable television presents a unique op-
portunity for residents of poor and disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods in particular by "alleviating the profound feeling of 
voicelessness, through abundant channels and open access for 
the presentation of all views."240 
Although cable access requirements further many of the 
235. See T. EMERSON, supra note 219, at 11-13. 
236. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931). 
237. T. EMERSON, supra note 219, at 12-13. 
238. See F. F'RIENDLY, DuE TO CIRCUMSTANCES BEYOND OUR CONTROL ... 266-300 
(1968); N. JOHNSON, How TO TALK BACK TO YOUR TELEVISION SET 152 (1970); Bazelon, 
supra note 89, at 209. 
239. See SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 126. 
240. Parting Words, CABLEVISION, Dec. 15, 1980, at 264 (quoting Ralph Lee Smith). 
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purposes of the First Amendment, those rules may not ad-
vance those objectives in a manner inconsistent with the Con-
stitution.241 One question which access requirements appear 
to raise concerns the First Amendment right of cable operators 
to refrain from speaking.242 In West Virginia State Board of 
Education v. Barnette243 and in Wooley v. Maynard,244 the 
Supreme Court struck down state laws which required private 
individuals to either affirm or disseminate the advancement of 
ideas with which they disagreed. Barnette involved a compul-
sory flag salute in public schools, and Wooley dealt with a New 
Hampshire law which required state license plates to carry the 
slogan "Live Free or Die." These decisions rested on the fun-
damental principle that" [a] system which secures the right to 
proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also 
guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such 
concepts.,,245 . 
The holdings in these cases, however, do not require a find-
ing that cable access rules would be unconstitutional as well. 
The Supreme Court, in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins ,246 pointed out the differences between these ''right to re-
frain from speaking" decisions and a state law designating a 
private shopping center as a forum for the speech of others. 
Those differences make Barnette and Wooley inapplicable to 
both the shopping center case and any analysis of the constitu-
tionality of a law designating a cable television channel as a 
forum for the speech of others. 
The first difference was that the law in Wooley required that 
a message be displayed on personal property that was used as 
part of the protesting individual's daily life. Both a shopping 
center and a cable television system, by contrast, are "not lim-
ited to the personal use" of their owners.247 A shopping center 
is open to the public to come and go as it pleases. A cable sys-
tem carries signals from broadcast television stations and may 
offer programming from independent pay television networks 
241. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980). 
242. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. 
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943). 
243. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
244. 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
245. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (citations omitted). 
246. 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
247. [d. at 87. The Court termed this the "most important" distinguishing factor 
between Pruneyard and Wooley, id .. 
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as welI,248 
Second, both Wooley and Barnette involved private affirma-
tion of a governmentally prescribed position or message.249 
Neither Pruneyard nor public access cable requirements in-
volve recitation of a state-dictated point of view.250 There is 
thus no danger of "governmental discrimination for or against 
a particular message."251 
Finally, both the owner of the shopping center and the cable 
television operator remain free to "expressly disavow any con-
nection" with the position expressed.252 The shopping center 
owner can post a sign, the cable operator can publish in the 
contract with subscribers or any channel guide distributed by 
the operator, or can transmit on the access channel itself, a 
statement disclaiming sponsorship of the message and ex-
plaining that, by state law, the communication is prohibited 
from being restricted.253 
A second stricture which cable access rules must not violate 
if they are to be constitutionally valid is the "central tenet of 
the First Amendment that the government must remain neu-
tral in the marketplace of ideas.,,254 That principle means that 
the government may not "[set] the agenda of public discus-
248. See text accompanying notes 71-72, 83-87, supra. 
249. Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 87-88. 
250. [d. at 87. 
251. [d. 
252. [d. 
253. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), which struck down a require-
ment that government employees pay, in their union dues, to support causes with 
which they disagreed, was not discussed in Pruneyard. However the crucial distinc-
tion between the right of a private individual to remain silent and the rights of a busi-
ness entity, the use of which are not limited to that of its owners, is not contradicted by 
Abood. Additionally, Abood specifically relied on the statement in Barnette, "If there 
is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, 
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters 
of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." Abood, 431 
U.S. at 235 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). 
Public access requirements, though, do not favor one ideological or philosophical 
position over another; they permit all members of a community to speak on all sides of 
an issue. Accordingly, cable access rules do not present the danger that a government 
official will force citizens or even cable operators, ''to confess by word" faith in an offi-
cially prescribed orthodoxy. 
254. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 745-46 (plurality opinion). See Wooley, 
430 U.S. at 717; Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). The 
government must step in, however, when there are conflicting demands by competing 
speakers for use of the same forum, for the purpose of "protecting individuals or 
groups from nongovernmental interference in the exercise of their rights; and in elimi-
nating obstacles to the effective functioning of the system." T. EMERSON, supra note 
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sion,"255 and that any government regulation which involves 
speech must operate "in a manner consistent with the com-
mand of the Equal Protection Clause."256 
Requiring the setting aside of one cable channel for public 
access on a first-come, first-served basis does not offend this 
principle of neutrality. First, access rules do not serve to dis-
seminate a State ideology; there is no concern of government 
transmission of objectionable propaganda.257 Second, the ac-
cess rules, by their very nature, permit discussion by people 
possessing opinions on all sides of an issue.258 Thus, there is 
no danger of the government giving "one side of a debatable 
public question an advantage in expressing its views to the 
people .... "259 And, because users of the public access chan-
nel can discuss whatever issue they desire, there is no risk that 
government will determine the subjects for permissible 
debate.26o 
Cable access requirements also do no violate the equal pro-
tection clause.261 All speakers who so desire are given equal 
opportunities to use the cable system.262 Additionally, cable 
television operators are not being discriminated against uncon-
stitutionally just because other owners of different media are 
not subject to the same requirements: "Each medium of ex-
pression. . . must be assessed for First Amendment purposes 
by standards suited to it, for each may present its own 
problems.,,263 
Another fundamental principle of the First Amendment is 
that government is prohibited from, "limiting the stock of infor-
mation from which members of the public may draw."264 In 
219 at 29. See, Mosley, 408 U.S. at 98; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630; Cox v. New Hampshire, 
312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941). 
255. E.g., Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2922 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
256. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 471. 
257. See text accompanying notes 251-252 supra. 
258. See text accompanying notes 228-229 supra. 
259. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785. 
260. "To allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate 
would be to allow the government control over the search for political truth." Consoli-
dated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 538. See Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. at 462 n.6; Mosley, 408 
U.S. at 95; Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concWTing in part). 
261. See Carey, 447 U.S. at 461-62; Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. 
262. See text accompanying note 229, supra. 
263. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 557. See also cases discussed in note 
129, supra. 
264. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 783. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 
(1963). In Grosjean, the Court struck down a tax on newspapers, "because, in the light 
of its history and of its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate and calculated 
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Buckley v. Valeo,265 the Supreme Court upheld a limitation on 
the amount an individual could contribute to a political cam-
paign but ruled that any government limitation on the amount 
that candidates could spend on their own campaigns, or the 
amount that private individuals could spend independently 
from a campaign, violated the .First Amendment. The Court 
ruled that it was improper to attempt to equalize the relative 
ability of one group of speakers by limiting the speech of other 
speakers: ''The concept that government may restrict the 
speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the 
relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First 
Amendment. . . ."266 
This prescription, however, does not lead to the invalidation 
of cable television access rules. The Buckley decision stated 
that such restriction was constitutionally impermissible be-
cause the First Amendment was designed to secure the widest 
possible dissemination of information from diverse and antag-
onistic sources, and to. assure unfettered exchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social change desired by the 
people.267 In fact, the Court specifically noted that the differ-
ence between the campaign expenditure law and the F.C.C.'s 
equal time provisions was that the effect of the spending limi-
tation was to supp~ess the amount of speech while the effect of 
the fairness doctrine is one of "enhancing the volume and qual-
ity of coverage of public issues."268 A public access channel, 
like the equal time rule and unlike the limitation on campaign 
spending, will increase the stock of information from which a 
community may draw and improve the coverage of public is-
sues by permitting speakers from all sides of an issue to pres-
ent their case.269 
Additionally, the speech of a cable television operator is not 
limited in the same way as either a candidate or independent 
commentator would have been by the restrictions struck down 
in Buckley. Those restrictions sharply curtailed the right of an 
device in the guise of a tax to limit the circulation of information to which the public is 
entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties." [d. at 250. 
265. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
266. [d. at 48-49 (emphasis added). 
267. [d. at 49. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266 & 269, United 
States v. Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 20, and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 
(1957». 
268. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 49 n.55 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 393). 
269. See text accompanying note 229, supra. 
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individual to engage in "vigorous advocacy"270 and the right of 
a candidate "to engage in the discussion of public issues and 
vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election and the 
election of other candidates."271 To the contrary, cable televi-
sion operators remain free to discuss any and all issues as vig-
orously as they wish.272 While they are losing control of one 
channel,273 they retain the power to use the remaining chan-
nels to express their positions.274 And those cable television 
operators who do not have any channels remaining for their 
own use can continue to communicate their ideas both through 
taking their turn on the public access channel and through util-
ization of any other medium of communication.275 
III 
The Constitutional Classification of Public Access 
Requirements 
That public access requirements for cable television further 
fundamental First Amendment goals does not, by itself, estab-
lish the constitutionality of those requirements. The nature of 
the restriction imposed on the cable television operator must 
be classified so that the proper constitutional test may be ap-
plied. There are a variety of ways by which access require-
ments arguably can be classified. Each of these would lead to 
the conclusion that imposition of access requirements would 
not infringe unconstitutionally on a cable operator's First 
Amendment rights. 
270. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 48 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 
U.S. at 269). 
271. Id. at 52. 
272. See Metromedia, Inc., - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2921 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
("These same messages can reach an equally large audience through a variety of other 
media: newspapers, television, radio, magazines, direct mail, pamphlets, etc. . . . It 
borders on the frivolous to suggest that the [ban on billboard advertising) infringes on 
freedom of expression, given the wide range of alternative means available."). 
273. In some instances, in fact, that channel will be unused. See Kreiss, Deregula· 
tion of Cable Television and the Problem of Access Under the First Amendment, 54 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1033-39 (1981). 
274. See text accompanying notes 79-82, supra. 
275. Even if it were slightly more convenient for a cable operator to express his 
views in the absence of an access requirement, that ease would only be the result of 
monopoly control of a means of communication otherwise closed to all. Cj. Red Lion, 
395 U.S. at 389 ("[T)he licensee has no constitutional right to ... monopolize a radio 
frequency to the exclusion of his fellow citizens."). 
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A. Local Regulation of a Community's Streets 
Because cable television systems must use municipal rights-
of-way to construct their distribution systems, the state and 
the locality can require the operator to obtain a franchise from 
the locality before beginning construction of the system.276 
The use of the public streets traditionally gives the local gov-
ernment the power and authority to regulate a business using 
those streets.277 The general principle is that ''reasonable con-
ditions can be attached to a grant for the use of streets."278 
Cable television companies in many states thus are subject 
to numerous restrictions. The rates they can charge subscrib-
ers are regulated and limited.279 They can neither curtail serv-
ice nor transfer ownership of their business without official 
approvaJ.280 They must supply safe and adequate service and 
they must wire every part of their franchise area, even in those 
areas where it will be uneconomical to do SO.281 
Public access requirements constitute a similar ''reasonable'' 
condition that can be imposed in exchange for a cable com-
pany's right to use the public ways. They serve valid state in-
terests in permitting members of the community to utilize this 
limited means of communication and in increasing the presen-
276. See Boulder I, 630 F.2d at 707. See generally W. BAER, supra note 19, at 4; Rice, 
The Communications Pipeline, PuBLIC MANAGEMENT, June 1980, at 2-4. While one 
court has stated that cable is not sufficiently affected with a public interest to pennit 
regulation on that basis, Greater Fremont, bic., 302 F. Supp. at 665 (''The public has 
about as much real need for the services of a CATV system as it does for hand carved 
ivory back-scratchers."), it is generally acknowledged that cable systems, by providing 
access to a complete offering of diverse television communications, are affected with 
an important public interest. See, e.g., Connecticut Television v. Public Utilities Com-
mission, 159 Conn. 317, 296 A.2d 276 (1970); Borough of Scottdale v. National Cable Tel-
evision Corp., 381 A.2d 859 (1977); R. SMITH, THE WIRED NATION 91 (1972). This has also 
been the specific detennination of several states as the basis for their regulation of 
cable television; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2006 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.01 
(West Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 711.080 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 48:5A-2(a) (West 
Supp. 1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAws § 811 (McKenney Supp. 1981). 
277. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-2006 (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.01 (West 
Supp. 1981); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 811 (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
278. Borough oj Scottdale, 381 A.2d at 862. See Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Sedalia, 
518 S.W.2d 48, 54 (Mo. 1974). This type of regulation is also within the state's inherent 
police power, see text accompanying notes 442-444, in:fra. 
279. See, e.g .• CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-333d (Supp. 1981); KAN. STAT. § 12-2008 (Supp. 
1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:5A-11, 48:5A-28 (West Supp. 1981). 
280. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 238.05 (West Supp. 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 48:5A-
37,48:5A-43 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAw §§ 826,827 (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
281. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 166A §§ 5(n), 8 (West 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 48:5A-36, 48:5A-39 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. EXEC. LAw § 824 (McKinney Supp. 1981). 
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tation of local issues and opinions on the local media.282 
Although some expense may be necessary for a cable televi-
sion company to comply with a public access requirement, this 
would not invalidate the regulation.283 The Supreme Court has 
held that "[ a] reasonable fixing of the amount of the fee" 
charged by a locality for use of its public streets is valid.284 The 
Court similarly has upheld the imposition of a fee for use of a 
privately owned mailbox.285 The Court stated that the require-
ment that postage must be paid on all letters placed in a 
mailbox was not unconstitutional even though it was the recip-
ient of the letters who paid for the ''physical components" of 
the mailbox.286 Justice White, in his concurring opinion, stated 
that the governmental interest in defraying operating ex-
penses and minimizing the stuffing of a mailbox with un-
stamped material was sufficient to justify the fee, even if it 
"will totally prevent the putative user from communicating 
with his intended correspondents."287 
The requirement that a cable television company set aside a 
channel for public access programming and help establish a 
studio for such programming can be viewed as a ''reasonable 
fee" imposed on the cable company in exchange for the com-
pany's access to the locality's streets. Even if cable operators 
were to be restricted somewhat in their ability to exhibit their 
own programming on the cable system, such a rule would still 
282. See text accompanying notes 228-229 and 232, supra. 
283. Equipment for a small black and white production unit can cost as little as 
$30,000. BROADCAST/CABLE YEARBOOK, G3 (1981). See Midwest 1,406 U.S. at 671 (plu· 
rality opinion); USES OF CABLE, supra note 80, at 23. 
284. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576-77 (1941). The Court held that a law 
requiring a license fee for parades or precessions, "not a revenue tax, but one to meet 
the expense incident to the administration of the [law) and to the maintenance of pub· 
lic order in the matter licensed," was permissible. Id. A public access requirement for 
cable television, likewise, is not promulgated to raise revenue but to ensure that the 
private business which has obtained either the exclusive right, or one of a limited 
number of rights·of.way, to the public streets is operated in the public interest. 
285. Council o/Greenburgh Civil Associations, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981). 
286. Id. at 2684. Just as a mailbox which is constructed or purchased by a private 
individual becomes an, "essential part of the . . . nationwide system for tile delivery 
and receipt of mail" and thus subject to the Postal Service's regulations, id., the pri· 
vately constructed cable system, which uses the public streets in laying down the dis· 
tribution network, and the public airwaves as the "backbone" of its program offering, 
becomes an essential part of the local electronic communications service, and accord· 
ingly is subject to reasonable regulation, see text accompanying notes 199-201 and 277-
279,supra. 
287. 101 S. Ct. at 2691. 
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be valid as a reasonable obligation imposed on those who use 
the public ways. 
B. Regulation of a Scarce Electronic Communications Medium 
The regulation of radio and television by the federal govern-
ment has been held to be constitutional by the Supreme Court 
because the "broadcast spectrum simply is not large enough to 
accommodate everybody."288 Because of the problems of inter-
ference between broadcast signals, only a limited number of 
frequencies can be used. The number of persons who want to 
broadcast far exceeds that limited number.289 
However, the government is not restricted in its power to 
regulate broadcast frequencies solely to ''traffic control."290 
Not only may Congress prevent interference between broad-
cast stations, it is permitted to regulate the broadcast media 
"in the public interest."291 This broad authority for govern-
mental regulation is due to the scarcity of the broadcast fre-
quencies, the necessity for government to allocate those 
frequencies, and "the legitimate claims of those unable with-
out governmental assistance to gain access to those frequen-
cies for expression of their views."292 
The power of government to require, consistent with the 
First Amendment, broadcasters to permit others to use their 
frequencies was delineated by the Supreme Court in three 
cases, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,293 CBS v. Democratic 
National Committee,294 and CBS v. FCC.295 In Red Lion, the 
Court upheld two requirements of the fairness doctrine. The 
first was that whenever a broadcaster endorses a political can-
didate, the opposing candidates must be offered time to reply 
288. NBC, 319 U.S. at 213. See also Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 396-401. Other reasons that 
have been given for regulating radio and television include: "their uniquely pervasive 
presence in the lives of all Americans," FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 748; the 
fact that broadcasting is "uniquely accessible to children," id. at 744; and that broad-
cast listeners and viewers are a "captive audience," that is they may only avoid 
messages by performing some affirmative physical act, CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Na-
tional Committee, 412 U.S. at 127, Banzhq/, 405 F.2d at 1100. It is noteworthy that all of 
these concerns, even the "unique" factors, apply to cable television as well as 
broadcasting. 
289. National Citizens Committee/or Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 799. 
290. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 395; NBC, 319 U.S. at 217-18. 
291. National Citizens Committee/or Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 795. 
292. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 400-01. 
293. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
294. 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
295. 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981). 
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either personally or through a representative.296 The second 
requirement was that whenever a personal attack is made on 
an individual involved in a public issue, that individual must 
be offered an opportunity to respond personally.297 The Court 
stated that because only a tiny fraction of those with the re-
sources and know-how could hope to communicate through 
broadcast frequencies,298 "the Government is permitted to put 
restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should 
be expressed on this unique medium."299 
The Court outlined some characteristics of the broadcast me-
dium which distinguish it from the print medium. For exam-
ple, licenses to broadcast do not confer ownership of broadcast 
frequencies, only the temporary privilege of using those fre-
quencies.30o But the most important distinction is that because 
there are "substantially more individuals who want to broad-
cast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an 
unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast compara-
ble to the right of every individual to speak, write, or pub-
lish."301 Accordingly, the Court held, "[t]here is no sanctuary 
in the First Amendment for unlimited private censorship oper-
ating in a medium not open to all.,,302 
The Court said that in evaluating the constitutionality of the 
fairness doctrine, "[ i] t is the right of the viewers and listeners, 
not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.,,303 And 
the public's right includes the right "to receive suitable access 
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and 
experiences. "304 
To further this public right, the Court said, conflicting views 
and opinions must be aired. The Court noted the informational 
value in permitting those who disagree with the broadcaster to 
state their own position rather than be forced to rely on the 
296. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 374-75. This rule is now located at 47 C.F.R. 73.1930 
(1980). 
297. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 373-74. The CUlTent rule is located at 47 C.F.R. 73.1920 
(1980). 
298. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 387-88. 
299. Id. at 390. 
300. Id. at 394 (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 301, 307(d». 
301. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388. 
302. Id. at 392. The Court also quoted its statement in Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 
20, "Freedom of the press from governmental interference under the First Amendment 
does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interests." 395 U.S. at 392. 
303. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
304. Id. at 390. 
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same broadcaster's restatement and interpretation of their 
views: 
The expression of views opposing those which broadcasters 
permit to be aired in the first place need not be confined solely 
to the broadcasters themselves as proxies. "Nor is it enough 
that he should hear the arguments of adversaries from his own 
teachers, presented as they state them, and accompanied by 
what they offer as refutations. That is not the way to do justice 
to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his own 
mind. He must be able to hear them from persons who actually 
believe them; who defend them in earnest, and do their very 
utmost for them.,,305 
In CBS v. Democratic National Committee, the Court re-
jected an argument that the policy of a television station to re-
fuse to sell time for any political or editorial advertising 
violated the First Amendment. First, the Court said, the Fed-
eral Communications Commission was not required to order 
stations to sell advertising time because "the public interest in 
providing access to the marketplace of 'ideas and experiences' 
would scarcely be served by a system so heavily weighted in 
favor of the financially affluent, or those with access to 
wealth.,,306 Even if the fairness doctrine were applied to polit-
ical advertisements so as to require stations to make equal 
time available free-of-charge for those who disagree with the 
paid political advertisements, the Court stated that the 
wealthy would still be able to determine the issues to be 
discussed.307 
The second problem the Court foresaw was that Federal 
Communications Commission regulation of political advertis-
ing would create a risk of enlargement of governmental control 
of debate of public issues on the airwaves.308 The Court said 
that "[t]he Commission's responsibilities under a right-of-ac-
cess system would tend to draw it into a continuing case-by-
305. Id. at 392 n.1B (quoting, J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 32 (R. McCallum ed. 1947». The 
Court stated: 
[lIt is not unreasonable for the FCC to conclude that the objective of adequate 
presentation of all sides may best be served by allowing those most closely 
affected to make the response, rather than leaving the response in the hands 
of the station which has attacked their candidacies, endorsed their opponents, 
or carried a personal attack upon them. 
Id. at 379. 
306. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 123. 
307. Id. 
30B. Id. at 126. 
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case determination of who should be heard and when."309 
The Court distinguished this case from those which prohib-
ited the government from banning some protected speech from 
a public area while permitting other speech in the same 
area.3lO The Court said that those cases were inapplicable to a 
case concerning a private right of access to the broadcast me-
dia because: 
In none of those cases did the forum sought for expression have 
an affirmative and independent statutory obligation to provide 
full and fair coverage of public issues, such as Congress has 
imposed on all broadcast licensees. In short, there is no "dis-
crimination" against controversial speech present in this case. 
The question here is not whether there is to be discussion of 
controversial issues of public importance on the broadcast me-
dia, but rather who shall determine what issues are to be dis-
cussed by whom, and when.3ll 
The Supreme Court did uphold a right of access to the broad-
cast media in CBS v. FCC. The Court ruled that a Federal 
Communications Commission requirement that broadcast sta-
tions make time available for sale, upon request, to legally 
qualified candidates for federal elective office3l2 was constitu-
tional. While acknowledging that it "has never approved a gen-
eral right of access to the media," the Court stated that this 
case only involved "a limited right to 'reasonable' access that 
pertains only to legally qualified federal candidates and may 
be invoked by them only for the purpose of advancing their 
candidacies once a campaign has commenced. "313 
Justice White, in his dissent, argued that this right of access 
encroached upon the discretion of the broadcaster: "Instead of 
adhering to this traditional approach, the Court has laid the 
foundation for the unilateral right of candidates to demand and 
receive a 'reasonable' amount of time a candidate determines 
to be necessary to execute a particular campaign strategy."314 
The Court ruled that regardless of such assertions, ''the statu-
tory right of access . . . properly balances the First Amend-
309. ld. at 127. 
310. E.g., Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). 
311. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 129-30 (emphasis 
added). 
312. This requirement enforced the statutory mandate of 47U.S.C. § 312(a) (7) 
(1981). 
313. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2830. 
314. ld. at 2839. 
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ment rights of federal candidates, the public, and 
broadcasters."315 
Cable television, like radio or television, is a scarce commu-
nications resource.316 The physical limitation of pole space,317 
the reasonable desire of a city or town to limit the number of 
times its public streets are torn up in order to lay down a 
cable,318 the public policy reasons for granting an exclusive 
franchise,319 and the unique economic characteristics of the 
cable television industry320 serve to limit the number of per-
sons who can operate a cable television system in any commu-
nity. As is true of the broadcast media, "all who possess the 
financial resources and the desire to communicate" by cable 
television "cannot be satisfactorily accommodated."321 
If the federal government is permitted to regulate the scarce 
broadcast frequencies to assure diversity of opinion, then the 
state government should be permitted to regulate the inher-
ently and inevitably limited cable television medium to ''pre-
serve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas."322 A public access 
requirement serves just such a purpose. 
The argument that regulation of cable television as a 
"scarce" resource is impermissible because there can be more 
than one cable television system in a locality323 must fail. Reg-
ulation of broadcast television due to its scarcity is still consti-
tutional even though in most areas of the country there is more 
than one television station which can be received.324 In those 
localities there is no "monopoly" control of the airwaves, since, 
as Professor Posner has pointed out, "different frequencies 
315. Id. at 2830. 
316. E.g., Boulder II, 7 Media L. Rptr. at 1999. The court of appeals held that govern-
ment was permitted to deal with the effects of cable television's "medium scarcity." 
Id. 
317. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra. 
318. See note 184 supra. 
319. The reasons include ease of regulation, e.g., Multiple Queens Cable Licenses 
Urged, N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1980, at C18, col. 4, and the encouragement to wire unprofit-
able areas, see text accompanying notes 282, supra. 
320. See text accompanying notes 50-70, supra. 
321. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 101. See text accom-
panying note 406, infra. 
322. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390. 
323. See Posner, supra note 212, at Ill. 
324. 99.8% of television households can receive at least two over-the-air stations, 
90.26% can receive at least four stations. Office of Plans and Policy, Federal Communi-
cations Commission, FCC Policy on Cable Ownership 22 (1981). 
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are, within a range, perfect substitutes for one another."325 
Thus, it is not a monopolistic characteristic of the broadcast 
media which permits government regulation, but an "oligolo-
polistic" nature. The same should hold true for cable 
television.326 
Similarly, although the scarcity of cable television systems 
in a given area may be due, in large part, to governmental pol-
icy,327 this does not defeat the right of local government to reg-
ulate cable television in the public interest. Much of the 
scarcity of television broadcast frequencies is due to a decision 
by the Federal Communications Commission to encourage the 
concept that localities should have at least one "local" televi-
sion station whenever possible.328 This local-station concept 
permitted the operation of fewer television stations than physi-
cally possible because of the need to avoid interference with all 
the local signals.329 Again to quote Professor Posner: "The 
scarcity of television channels differs from the scarcity of other 
natural resources only in the fact that it is to a significant ex-
tent the product of deliberate governmental policies."33o 
Another similan.ty between cable television and the broad-
cast media is that control of cable television systems, radio sta-
tions, and broadcast television channels is of a transitive 
nature. With both cable and broadcast television, as well as 
radio, although one can own the physical equipment necessary 
for communication (studios, antennae, or distribution sys-
tems) one does not "own" the right to communicate.331 Televi-
sion and radio broadcast licenses are limited to three years' 
duration and need not be renewed.332 Similarly, cable televi-
sion franchises typically are limited to ten or 15 years.333 At 
325. R. POSNER, supra note 52, at 313. 
326. See text accompanying notes 52-70, supra. 
327. E.g., Posner, supra note 212, at 111. 
328. E.g., In the Matter of Amendment of Section 3.606 of the Commission's Rules 
and Regulations (Sixth Report and Order), 41 F.C.C. 148, 171-72 (1952). See generally 
Schuessler, Structural Barriers to the Entry of Additional Television Networks: The 
Federal Communications Commission's Spectrum Management Policies, 54 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 880 (1981). 
329. Posner, supra note 212, at 125 & n.54. See also Schuessler, supra note 329, at 
988-91. 
330. R. POSNER, supra note 52, at 313. 
331. See also Associates and Aldrich Co., 440 F.2d at 136 ("Unlike broadcasting, the 
publication of a newspaper is not a government conferred privilege."). 
'332. 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1981). 
333. E.g., DEL. CODE tit. 26 § 604 (1980); HAw. REV. STAT. § 44OG-10 (Supp. 1979); 
KAN. STAT. § 12-2007 (Supp. 1975). 
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the end of that period, the municipality is free to decide not to 
renew the franchise agreement and to select another cable 
company.334 Additionally, broadcast licenses and many cable 
franchises can be revoked during the license or franchise pe-
riod due to serious misconduct or failure to abide by the terms 
of the licensing or franchise agreements.335 
There is one distinction between cable television and the 
broadcast media which would, in fact, seem to indicate a 
greater likelihood that an access requirement for cable televi-
sion be held to be constitutional than would a similar require-
ment for the broadcast media. Broadcast television and radio 
licensees have an affirmative duty to present "full and fair cov-
erage of important public issues."336 The obligation imposed 
by the federal government on cable television operators, in 
contrast, is much less rigid: if, and only if, they produce pro-
grams, operators must "afford reasonable opportunity for dis-
cussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance."337 
Not only does this duty not call for "full and fair coverage," it 
applies solely to programming produced by the cable operator. 
It does not apply to programming on channels leased to third 
parties by the operator,338 even though it is the operator, in 
most cases, who has selected the lease channel program produ-
cer.339 Additionally, there is no obligation for the operators 
who do not produce their own programming either to cover 
334. See generally The New Era: Rejranchising Comes of Age, CABLEVISION, Dec. 7, 
1981, at 115-57. 
335. Compare 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (1981) with DEL. CODE tit. 26, § 606 (Supp. 1980); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 711, 130 (1979) and R.I. GEN. LAws § 39-19-8 (1981). 
336. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 129. 
337. 47 C.F.R. 76.209 (1980). See generally Barrow, Program Regulation in Cable TV.' 
Fostering Debate in a Cohesive Audience, 61 VA. L. REV. 515 (1975). The enforcement 
of this duty by the Federal Communications Commission is much weaker, as well. Un-
like broadcasters whose licenses must be renewed every three years by the Commis-
sion every three years, and who must prove each time that their obligations have been 
fulfilled, cable operators are franchised by the state or locality, see text accompanying 
notes 193 and 333, supra. The only policying authority the Commission has is the 
power to revoke the registration statement the operator has rued with the Commission. 
47 C.F.R. §§ 76.9, 76.12 (1980). In the research for this article, not a single case of the 
Commission revoking a cable operator's registration statement (or the statement's 
predecessor, the certificate of compliance) for non-compliance with this obligation was 
discovered. 
338. See text accompanying notes 83-87, supra. 
339. The exceptions being those instances where the franchise agreement itself re-
quires that channels be made available to specific programmers, as was done in Pitts-
burgh where one channel was set aside for programming by the Christian Associates 
of Western Pennsylvania. Panero, supra note 78, at 332. 
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fairly, or to cover at all, important local issues. Thus, while 
there may not be "discrimination" against controversial speech 
if broadcast licensees are permitted journalistic discretion in 
determining the manner for discussion of public issues,340 
without statutory or regulatory safeguards there would be a 
grave question of "whether there is to be discussion of contro-
versial issues of public importance,,341 on cable television.342 
A public access cable television requirement can encourage 
such discussion far more effectively than the fairness doctrine. 
The public access channel operates as an open forum; it is not 
triggered by speech presented by the cable television opera-
tor.343 Thus, the access channel does not discourage the cable 
operator from exhibiting controversial programming. 
But the fairness doctrine, because it only requires that free 
time be supplied in response to the broadcast of a controver-
sial position, provides a powerful incentive for timidity and 
avoidance of controversy.344 This, in effect, leads to a "self-cen-
340. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 130. 
341. [d. 
342. Another similarity between broadcast and cable television is that, rather than 
being parcelled out to a limited number of licensees and franchisees, both media could 
have been made available to the general public as common carriers. In Red Lion, the 
Court said that Congress, to protect the public· interest in receiving information and 
opinions from diverse sources, could have devised a system other than the present 
licensing scheme: 
Rather than confer frequency monopolies on a relatively small number of 
licensees, in a Nation of 200,000,000, the Government could surely have de· 
creed that each frequency should be shared among all or some of those who 
wish to use it, each being assigned a portion of the broadcast day or the broad· 
cast week. 
395 U.S. at 390-91. Similarly, ownership of the cable distribution system could have 
been separated entirely from the selection of the programming to be carried by that 
system: 
The only way to avoid the broadcast regulatory model and allow cable to de-
velop as a. medium of communications open and available in a manner similar 
to the print or film media is to preclude the vertical integration of the program-
ming and distribution functions in cable. In this way, the cable operator's dis-
tribution monopoly would not produce any concentration of power over free 
expression in the use of cable channels and would offer no pretext for Govern-
ment control of programming or other information distributed by cable. 
Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 25. See also R. SMITH, supra note 277, at 89-92. 
343. See text accompanying note 88, supra. 
344. E.g., SLOAN COMMISSION, supra note 50, at 93-94. The Court in Red Lion, while 
upholding the fairness doctrine acknowledged the possibility of this danger: 
It is strenuously argued, however, that if political editorials or personal attacks 
will trigger an obligation in broadcasters to afford the opportunity for expres-
sion to speakers who need not pay for time and whose views are unpalatable 
to the licensees, then broadcasters will be irresistibly forced to self-censorship 
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sorship"345 by broadcasters which thereby "dampens the vigor 
and limits the variety of public debate."346 The advantage of a 
public access requirement is that it assures, rather than dis-
courages, the presentation of, and full debate on, the important 
controversial issues of the day. 
A public access requirement for cable television is not sub-
ject to the same criticism as the proposal that broadcasters be 
required to accept editorial advertising. While that proposal 
only opened the broadcast media to the "financially affluent or 
those with access to wealth,"347 a cable access channel permits 
all to present their views.348 The wealthy would not be able to 
either monopolize the channel or dictate the issues to be 
discussed. 
A second constitutional infirmity of the editorial advertising 
proposal, enlarged government involvement in determining 
the content of public debate, also does not apply to a cable ac-
cess requirement. Under a right-to-purchase-advertising rule, 
the Federal Communications Commission would have been re-
quired "to oversee far more of the day-to-day operations of 
broadcasters' conduct, deciding such questions as whether a 
particular individual or group has had sufficient opportunity to 
present its viewpoint and whether a particular viewpoint has 
already been sufficiently aired."349 The cable access rule would 
only require "content-neutral" government supervision, to as-
sure that the cable company operates its public access channel 
on a nondiscriminatory basis.350 The government, accordingly, 
would not be involved in the substance of the "editorial 
and their coverage of controversial public issues will be eliminated or at least 
rendered wholly ineffective. Such a result would indeed be a serious matter, 
for should licensees actually eliminate their coverage of controversial issues, 
the purpose of the doctrine would be stifled. 
At this point, however, as the Federal Communications Commission has indi-
cated, that possibility is at best speculative. 
395 U.S. at 392-93. 
345. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279. 
346. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 
279). See R. POSNER, supra note 52, at 313 ("But the fairness doctrine is not calculated 
to increase the broadcaster's output of ideas. On the contrary, it penalizes him for 
presenting controversial ideas by requiring him to present all sides of a controversy."). 
See also Bazelon, supra note 89, at 205-06. 
347. CBS, Inc. Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 123. 
348. See text accompanying notes 88-89, supra. 
349. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 124-26. 
350. See text accompanying note 88, supra. 
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process."351 
A cable access rule would, without causing the problems 
warned of in CBS v. Democratic National Committee, serve the 
same purposes as the rules upheld in Red Lion and CBS v. 
FCC. As the fairness doctrine requires a licensee to share in 
the frequency with non-licensees,352 an access rule would re-
quire a franchised cable company to share one channel with 
those without such a franchise. Each duty would lead to the 
presentation of "those views and voices which are representa-
tive of the community and which would otherwise, by neces-
sity, be barred from the airwaves"353 or the cable system. 
The Supreme Court, in CBS v. FCC, recognized three sepa-
rate sectors of the population with First Amendment interests: 
broadcasters, federal candidates, and the viewers and listen-
ers.354 The Court said that requiring broadcasters to sell adver-
tising time to candidates, made a "significant contribution to 
freedom of expression by enhancing the ability of candidates 
to present, and the public to receive, information necessary for 
the effective operation of the democratic process.,,355 While 
this decision only granted a "limited" right of access for federal 
candidates to the broadcast media,356 the reasoning used by 
the Court could support a requirement of an access channel for 
cable television. The First Amendment protection of freedom 
of expression is not limited to a discussion of the merits of vari-
ous candidates: "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its 
historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about 
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the 
members of society to cope with the exigencies of their pe-
riod."357 Even in CBS v. FCC, the Court acknowledged, 
"speech concerning public affairs is. . . the essence of self-gov-
ernment."358 Thus a cable access rule would significantly con-
tribute to freedom of expression by improving the ability of a 
wide range of speakers to present, and viewers to receive, im-
351. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 124-26. 
352. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389. 
353. [d. 
354. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2830. 
355. [d. 
356. [d. 
357. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 776 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02 
(1940) ). 
358. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2830. 
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portant, relevant information.359 Just as the Commission's rule 
did not "impair the discretion· of broadcasters to present their 
views on any issue or to carry any particular type of program-
ming,"360 a cable access rule would permit cable operators to 
continue to present their views and choice of programming on 
the remaining channels.361 As the Commission's rule ''prop-
erly balances the first amendment rights of federal candidates, 
the public, and broadcasters,"362 a cable access rule, setting 
aside one channel for use on a first-come, first-served basis, 
properly balances the First Amendment rights of those in the 
community who wish to express their views via the cable sys-
tem, the members of the community who receive information 
through the cable system, and the cable television operators. 
C. Time, Place, and Manner Regulation 
A local requirement that cable television operators set aside 
one channel for public access programming can also be viewed 
as a reasonable ''time, place, and manner" regulation.363 Spe-
cifically, an access requirement would be a restriction on the 
place and manner of a cable operator's communication. Time, 
place, and manner restrictions are constitutionally valid if they 
can be justified without reference to the restricted speech!s 
content, serve a significant. governmental interest, and leave 
ample alternative channels for communication.364 
The "constitutional touchstone" of ''time, place, and manner" 
regulation is that it be based on neither the content nor subject 
matter of the regulated speech.365 The Supreme Court held 
that a rule forbidding a public utility from including in its 
monthly billing envelope inserts discussing issues of public 
policy, while permitting inserts discussing noncontroversial 
matters, was not a time, place, or manner regulation because it 
was not "content-neutral."366 
A regulation that restricted the distribution and sale of reli-
gious material at a state fair to assigned booths, however, was 
359. See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra. 
360. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2830. 
361. See text accompanying notes 274-276, supra. 
362. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 101 S. Ct. at 2830. 
363. See Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 85-86. 
364. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771; Consolidated Edison Co., 447 
U.S. at 535-36. 
365. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 364 n.6 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
366. Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 537. 
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upheld as a valid time, place, and manner restriction in Heffron 
v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 367 The 
Court said that this rule was unrelated to the content or sub-
ject matter of the restricted speech since it "applies evenhand-
edly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or 
to solicit funds. No person or organization, whether commer-
cial or charitable, is permitted to engage in such activities ex-
cept from a booth rented for those purposes. "368 
A cable access rule is similarly content-neutral. It is unre-
lated to either the content or subject matter of the cable televi-
sion operator's speech.369 It applies evenhandedly to all with a 
cable franchise and is not based on governmental disapproval 
of the cable operator's views.37o 
A second requirement for time, place, and manner restric-
tions is that they further a "significant governmental inter-
est."371 Governmental interests which have been held to be 
significant include maintaining the orderly movement of a 
crowd at a state fair,372 regulating traffic,373 ensuring that simul-
taneous parades do not prevent all speakers from being 
heard,374 and improving the aesthetic quality of a municipal-
ity.375 A public access channel furthers many substantial gov-
ernmental interests including: increasing the diversity of 
speakers and topics presented through the cable system;376 en-
hancing the individual's interest in self-expression377 and the 
subscriber's interest in receiving a broad range of program-
ming and options;378 and protecting the peace within a commu-
nity by permitting the free and open exchange of ideas.379 
The third criterion for time, place, and manner regulation is 
that there remain adequate alternate channels of communica-
tion.380 The Court struck down a prohibition of the use of "For 
367. 101 s. ct. 2559 (1981). 
368. Id. at 2564. 
369. See text accompanying notes 344-346, supra. 
370. See text accompanying notes 258-261, supra. 
371. See Hejfron, 101 S. Ct. at 2565; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. 
372. Hejfron, 101 S. Ct. at 2565. 
373. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941). 
374. Id. at 576. 
375. Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2892 (plurality opinion). 
376. See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra. 
377. See text accompanying note 232, supra. 
378. See text accompanying note 235, supra. 
379. See text accompanying notes 239-41, supra. 
380. See Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2896-97 (plurality opinion); Linmark Associ· 
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Sale" signs on the lawns in front of houses because the options 
left for the sellers, newspaper advertising and listing with real 
estate brokers, were more expensive and less effective than the 
signs.381 The Court concluded that the aforementioned alter-
natives were "far from satisfactory."382 In a more recent case, 
newspaper, radio, and television advertising was determined to 
be an unsatisfactory substitute for billboard advertising be-
cause those alternatives were "insufficient, inappropriate, and 
prohibitively expensive."383 
In Heffron, the Supreme Court found that restricting the dis-
tribution of leaflets at a state fair to an assigned booth left ade-
quate forums for distribution of the material. First, the Court 
pointed out that leaflets could be distributed anywhere outside 
the fairgrounds.384 Second, and "more importantly" the Court 
said that this rule "has not been shown to deny access within 
the forum in question.,,385 The Court held that, for purposes of 
constitutional analysis, the fairgrounds should not be sepa-
rated into two sections, open areas and booths. Instead, be-
cause the booths were located within a major section of the fair 
and not "secreted away in some nonaccessible location," the 
relevant forum was the entire fairground.386 
Even if one channel is dedicated to use by the public, the 
cable television operator will have adequate alternate means 
for communicating desired information. First, the cable opera-
tors are free to utilize both their turn on the access channel 
and any or all of the existing alternative media to display their 
ates, Inc., 431 U.S. at 93; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771. If a regulation is 
content-based, it cannot be justified by the fact that there may be alternate means of 
communication available. Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 541 n.l0; Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 757 n.15; Southeastern Promotions Ltd., 420 U.S. at 556; Schnei-
der v. State, 308 U.S: 147, 163 (1939). But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 
50, 62 (1976) (upholding a requirement that adult movie theaters not be located near 
each other because, "the market for this commodity is essentially unrestrained."). Be-
cause a public access requirement is not based on the cable operator's speech, see 
notes 344-346, supra, and accompanying text, it would not be a content-based regula-
tion; accordingly, the availability of alternate means of communication for the cable 
operator is relevant. 
381. Linmark Associates, Inc., 431 U.S. at 93. 
382. Id. 
383. Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2897 (plurality opinion) (quoting a stipulation of 
both parties, Joint Stipulation No. 28.). 
384. He.tfron, 101 S. Ct. at 2567. 
385. Id. 
386. Id. at 2568 n.16. 
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messages.387 Second, many cable operators have several chan-
nels available for programming; even if one channel is reserved 
for public access, the cable operator may communicate 
through the remaining channels.388 As the Heffron decision 
makes clear, the relevant forum for constitutional analysis is 
not the individual access channel by itself but the full panoply 
of channels which are available to the cable operator.389 Thus, 
if the cable operator can communicate on any channel, there 
remains an adequate alternate channel for the operator's 
communication. 
With cable access requirements, as with time, place, and 
manner regulations which have been upheld by the Supreme 
Court, "the net effect of the regulation on free expression 
would not be adverse.,,39o The Court has delineated the differ-
ence between regulations which limit the "manner" of commu-
nication and those which impose "direct quantity restrictions" 
on the amount of permissible communications:391 "The First 
Amendment protects the right of every citizen to 'reach the 
minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportu-
nity to win their attention.' "392 A rule establishing a cable ac-
cess channel would facilitate, rather than inhibit, the exchange 
of information, ideas, and impressions. The total amount of 
communication permitted the cable operator is not limited.393 
In Red Lion, the Court analogized the fairness doctrine to 
traditional time, place, and manner regulations: 
Just as the Government may limit the use of sound-amplifying 
equipment potentially so noisy that it drowns out civilized pri-
vate speech, so may the Government limit the use of broadcast 
equipment. The right of free speech of a broadcaster, the user 
of a sound truck, or any other individual does not embrace a 
right to snuff out the free speech of others.394 
Similarly, the government may limit the use of cable equip-
ment by establishing a public access channel. The right of free 
speech of a cable operator does not extend to a right to "snuff 
387. See text accompanying note 276, supra. 
388. See text accompanying notes 274-275, supra. 
389. See text accompanying notes 387-388, supra. 
390. Metromedia, Inc., 101 S. Ct. at 2913 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
391. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 18 & n.17 (emphasis omitted). 
392. HeJfron, 101 S. Ct. at 2567-68 (quoting Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 87). 
393. See text accompanying notes 274-276, supra. 
394. 3905 U.S. at 387. 
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out the free speech of others,"395 and the preservation of one 
channel for public use is a valid governmental regulation to 
protect the right of free speech of all members of the 
community. 
D. Promoting Diversity: The FCC versus the N.C.C.B. Model 
In FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting ,396 
the Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of regula-
tions designed to encourage diversity in mass communications. 
The rules prohibited cross-ownership of newspapers and 
either radio or television stations in the same community.397 
The goal of these regulations was to diversify ownership of 
these means of communications to "enhance the possibility of 
achieving greater diversity of viewpoints."398 The Court up-
held the rule, stating that "given the absence of persuasive 
countervailing considerations, 'even a small gain in diversity' 
was 'worth pursuing.' "399 The standard the Court utilized in 
determining the constitutionality of the rules is particularly 
noteworthy, as it indicates the Court's recognition of the im-
portance of encouraging the presentation of a diversity of view-
points: "The regulations are a reasonable means of promoting 
the public interest in diversified mass communications; thus 
they do not violate the First Amendment rights of those who 
will be denied broadcast licenses pursuant to them."40o 
A cable television access requirement is also a ''reasonable 
means" for promoting "diversified mass communications." 
The establishment of a channel for all members of a commu-
nity to state their opinions would undoubtedly lead to the pres-
entation of a greater diversity of viewpoints than would 
otherwise be available.401 Not only would there be more voices 
under an access requirement, these additional voices would be 
local voices, expressing local viewpoints and raising local con-
395. [d. See note 255, supra. 
396. 436 U.S. 775 (1978). 
397. [d. at 785 n.8 (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1976». The rules permit-
ted most instances of then-existing cross-ownership to continue. 436 U.S. at 779. 
398. 436 U.S. at 796. 
399. [d. at 786 (quoting Rules Relating to Multiple Ownership of Standard, FM, and 
Television Broadcast Stations, Second Report and Order, 50 F.C.C.2d 1046, 1076, 1080 
n.30 (1975». 
400. National Citizens Committee jor Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 802 (emphasis 
added). 
401. See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra. 
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cerns.402 As the Court pointed out, it is in the public interest to 
encourage programming for a community by those who reside 
in the community.403 
Because the N.C.C.B. ruling concerned the broadcast media, 
it is unclear whether the same ''reasonable means" test would 
be applied to cable television. One indication that the stan-
dard would be applied to cable arises froin the Court's further 
explanation of the applicability of the reasonableness test, to 
the F.C.C.'s rules: "Being forced to 'choose among applicants 
for the same facilities,' the Commission has chosen on a 'sensi-
ble basis,' one designed to further, rather than contravene, 'the 
system of freedom of expression.' "404 As a community must 
also select its cable television company from among several 
competing applicants,405 it should be permitted to establish 
"sensible" ground rules for promoting freedom of expression 
on the cable system.406 
402. See text accompanying note 235, supra. 
403. National Citizens Committee jor Broadcasting, 436 U.S. at 804, 808. 
404. Id. at 802 (quoting, T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 663 
(1970». 
405. For example, there were nine applicants for the New Orleans franchise, seven 
for Fort Worth, Panero, supra note 78, at 306-10. 
406. The Court in National Citizens Committeejor Broadcasting rejected two argu-
ments in opposition to the rules as inapplicable to a proposal to limit cross-ownership. 
The Court's analysis indicates that similar arguments also would not be relevant to 
cable access rules. 
The first claim was that the FCC rules unconstitutionally conditioned a benefit 
(ownership of a broadcast station) on forfeiture of a constitutional right (ownership of 
a newspaper). The Court distinguished Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) and 
Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), which voided the denial of public benefits due to 
refusal to take a loyalty oath and affiliation with a particular political organization, 
respectively, because the denial of benefits in those cases was based on the content of 
constitutionally protected speech and therefore had the effect of abridging freedom of 
expression. The Court said that the FCC rules, in contrast, "are not content related; 
moreover, their purpose and effect is to promote free speech, not to restrict it." 436 
U.S. at 801. 
Similarly, cable access rules are not content-related and serve to promote freedom of 
expression. Thus any claim that a locality is unconstitutionally conditioning the bene-
fit of a cable franchise on the forfeiture of the cable operator's right to speak on, and 
control, the access channel, see Ross, supra note 12, at 156, must be dismissed. 
A second argument the Court in National Citizens Committee for Broadcasting re-
jected was that the FCC had unfairly "singled out" newspaper owners in a fashion 
similar to the law struck down in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), 
which imposed a tax only on newspapers. One of the controlling distinctions between 
the FCC rules and the tax, was that the tax had the effect of limiting the circulation of 
information, "an effect inconsistent with the protection conferred Qn the press by the 
First Amendment," 436 U.S. at 801. Conversely, the FCC rules were designed, ''to en-
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E. An Incidental Restriction on First Amendment Rights 
Even if it is assumed that cable television operators have a 
First Amendment right to control the programming on all of a 
system's channels and that access requirements limit their 
ability to exercise that right, and it is further assumed that 
none of the earlier discussed classifications apply to cable ac-
cess rules, such requirements would not automatically be 
invalid. 
First Amendment rights are not absolute.407 The right of free 
speech has never been held to include a right for people to 
present their opinions ''whenever and however and wherever 
they please."408 The First Amendment "does not forbid the 
abridging of speech. But, at the same time, it does forbid the 
abridging of the freedom of speech. ,,409 
The Supreme Court has recognized the significance of the 
difference between regulation designed to abridge freedom of 
expression410 and regulation which imposes "incidental restric-
tions on First Amendment liberties by governmental action in 
furtherance of legitimate and substantial state interest other 
than suppression of expression."411 Governinental action of 
hance the diversity of information hearing by the public .... " [d. at 801 (quoting the 
lower court decision, 555 F.2d 938, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1977». 
An argument that access rules unfairly single out cable operators, see Midwest 11,571 
F.2d at 1055, would likewise be rejected because the rules also increase the diversity of 
information available to the public, see text accompanying notes 228·235, supra, and 
are thus consistent with First Amendment goals. Additionally, because of the unique 
characteristics of cable television, both its intimate relationship with the community 
and its ability to offer a great number of channels, see text accompanying notes 78 and 
193-198, supra, it is reasonable for a locality to impose access requirements solely on 
cable television operators. 
407. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1930). See also Nebraska Press Ass'n 
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 570. . 
408. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836 (1976). See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 
554. 
409. A. MEIKEWOHN, supra note 218, at 19. See also Metromedia, Inc., v. City of San 
Diego, 101 S. Ct. at 2920 ("But to say the ordinance presents a First Amendment issue 
is not necessarily to say that it constitutes a First Amendment violation." (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis in original»; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972) 
("Recognition that First Amendment rights are implicated, however, is not dispositive 
of our inquiry here."). 
410. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. at 535; 
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-85. 
411. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1974). See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, 
supra note 218, at 16-17 ("[LJet it be noted that ... Congress is not debarred from all 
action upon freedom of speech. Legislation which abridges that freedom is forbidden, 
but not legislation to enlarge and enrich it."). 
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the first kind is held to the strictest scrutiny.412 The latter form 
of regulation is constitutionally permissible if it meets a two-
part test: first, it must further an important governmental in-
terest unrelated to suppression of freedom of speech and, sec-
ond, the limitation on First Amendment rights must be no 
greater than is necessary to further that interest.413 
In United States v. Q'Brien,414 the CoUrt upheld a federal 
statute prohibiting the destruction of Selective Service regis-
tration certificates. The Court cited a number of substantial 
governmental interests in ensuring the continuing availability 
of draft cards which were unrelated to the communicative im-
pact of the destruction of the cards,415 and found that the stat-
ute was an "appropriately narrow" means to further those 
interests.416 
Cable access requirements also serve substantial and impor-
tant governmental interests which are unrelated to the sup-
pression of freedom of expression: encouraging discussion of 
public issues by all members of a community,417 increasing the 
amount and variety of information on local issues available 
through the cable system,418 and maintaining order in the com-
munity by permitting all members of the community to voice 
their concerns effectively, and feel, accordingly, that they have 
412. If a statute's purpose is the ''prohibition of the 'exposition of ideas,' " the state 
must show both a compelling subordinate interest and that the state used means nar-
rowly drawn to avoid necessary abridgement of speech. Bellotti v. First Nat'l Bank of 
Boston, 435 U.S. at 786. See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 447 U.S. at 540; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25. Cable access rules would not be 
subject to this test because their purpose is to enhance the extent and quality of public 
discussion, not to suppress speech, see text accompanying notes 268-276, supra. A 
cable access rule also does need to overcome the "special protection" which has been 
established against prior restraints, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 556. 
See Near v. Minnesota ex reI Olson, 283 U;S. 697 (1931). The Supreme Court has de-
fined a ''prior'' restraint as an order to ''prohibit the publication or broadcast of particu-
lar information commentary .... " Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 556 
(emphasis added). A requirement that cable operators set aside one channel for pub-
lic access does not bar the dissemination of any particular information. 
413. See Procunier, 416 U.S. at 413-14. See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-56 
(1980). 
414. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
415. The interests included: maintaining proof that an individual had registered for 
the draft, facilitating communication between registrants and the draft boards, re-
minding registrants to notify their draft boar<i of a change in address, and prohibiting 
forgery. [d. at 379-80. 
416. [d. at 382. 
417. See text accompanying note 232, supra. 
418. See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra. 
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had a fair chance to influence local decision-making.419 
A requirement that a cable television operator set aside one 
channel for public access is an "appropriately narrow" method 
of .furthering those interests. The scope of such a rule is lim-
ited, establishing a forum for free speech without unnecessa-
rily restricting the right or ability of cable operators to express 
their views.420 
There is a specific attribute of cable television which signifi-
cantly decreases the extent of First Amendment protection for 
the cable operator. Virtually every cable system offers pro-
gramming produced by a source other than local broadcasters 
or the system operator itself. Systems provide channels for 
distant broadcast signals421 and lease channels to pay en-
tertainment or other programmers.422 Thus the "speech" on 
those channels is not that of the cable operator but rather that 
of a third party. In Buckley v. Valeo,423 the Supreme Court rec-
ognized the difference between a direct limitation on a per-
son's speech and one on the right of a person to support the 
speech of another. While striking down a limit on the amount 
of money one could spend to express support for a candi-
date,424 the Court upheld a limitation on the amount a person 
could contribute to a candidate's campaign.425 The difference 
between the two limitations, according to the Court, was that 
the contribution limitation 
entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's abil-
ity to engage in free communication. . . . While contributions 
may result in political expression if spent by a candidate or an 
association to present views to the voters, the transformation 
of contributions into political debate involves speech by some-
419. See text accompanying notes 236-238, supra. 
420. See text accompanying notes 272-276, supra. 
421. The Federal Communication Commission's Rules limiting the number of dis-
tant stations a cable system could carry were deleted in 1980. 45 Fed. Reg. 60186, 60299 
(1980) (amending 47 C.F.R. §§.76.5. 76.7, 76.57, 76.59, 76.61, 76.63, 76.65, 76.151-161, 76.305). 
The Commission's change in those rules was upheld in Malrite TV v. FCC, 7 Media L. 
Rptr. 1649 (2d Cir. 1981). 
422. As of June 1, 1981, 3954 out of approximately 4400 cable systems offered pay 
channels. Spillman, Multiplay: A Case of Diminishing Returns?, CABLEVISION, June 1, 
1981, at 137. Additionally, many systems offer satellite-fed channels as part of their 
basic services. As of October 1, 1981, for example, 3633 systems offered WTBS (an 
Atlanta broadcast station) and 2900 offered CBN (Christian Broadcast Network). See 
Cable Stats, CABLE VISION, Nov. 23,1981, at 191. 
423. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
424. Id. at 39-51. 
425. Id. at 23-35. 
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one other than the contrlbutor.426 
In Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,427 which upheld a 
statute barring cigarette advertising from the "electronic me-
dia,"428 the district court held that a prohibition on a certain 
type of advertising had "no substantial effect on the exercise of 
broadcasters' First Amendment rights: "Even assuming that 
loss of revenue from cigarette advertisements affects [broad-
casters] with sufficient first amendment interest, [broadcast-
ers], themselves, have lost no right to speak-they have only 
lost an ability to collect revenue from others for broadcasting 
their commercial messages."429 
Similarly, a requirement that a cable operator reserve a 
channel for public access rather than providing or leasing that 
channel to a third party restricts marginally, if at all, the right 
of free speech of the cable operator. The speech which is lim-
ited is not that of the cable operator but of the other program-
mer. Therefore, in those circumstances where an access 
channel replaces a third-party-programmed channel, the "inci-
dental restriction" on the First Amendment rights of the cable 
television operator will be negligible. 
If the cable operator were to decide not to lease any of the 
available channels, but instead to use them for the operator's 
own programming, there would be a substantial problem of 
monopolization of a communications medium. Except for the 
print media,430 the Supreme Court has rejected a First Amend-
ment value in such total control. As the Court declared in Red 
426. [d. at 20-21. See California Medical Assoc. v. FEC, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2712, 
2722-23 (1981) (plurality opinion). Cj. Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980). The Court 
ruled that a law protecting servicemen's right to communicate with members of Con-
gress did not apply to petitions, thus rejecting Justice Stewart's dissent that, "it seems 
clear that a serviceman 'communicates' with his Congressman just as much when he 
signs a letter drafted by a third person as when he writes and signs that letter him-
self." [d. at 375. 
The Court struck down a local law limiting contributions to committees formed to 
support or oppose ballot initiatives in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berke-
ley, - U.S. -,102 S. Ct. 434 (1981). The Court held the law unconstitutional because it 
both restrained freedom of association and impermissibly limited freedom of expres-
sion because ''there is· no significant state or public interest in curtailing debate and 
discussion of a ballot measure." [d. at 4073-74. Neither of these rationales are applica-
ble to a cable access requirement. 
427. 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.C. Cir. 1971), summary a./f'd sub nom. Capital Broadcasting 
Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). 
428. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969,15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1980). 
429. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. at 584. 
430. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254-258. 
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Lion, "the First Amendment confers ... no right to an uncon-
ditional monopoly of a scarce resource which the Government 
has denied others the right to use."431 
While that decision dealt only with broadcast licensees, the 
same concern for monopoly control of a scarce resource ap-
plies to cable television. The report of the Cabinet Committee 
on Cable Television stated: 
The private power of the cable system operator is potentially 
great, because of the local monopoly characteristics of cable. 
Unless restrained in some manner, the system operator could 
control all of the channels on his system, which would consti-
tute the bulk of the channels of electronic communications in a 
particular locale.432 
Similarly, the Sloan Commission on Cable Communications 
also warned of the danger that, left unregulated, a cable televi-
sion operator could limit the diversity of available opinions and 
viewpoints: 
Questions of ownership and control of cable installations are 
also relevant to questions of fairness. If the mass of individual 
cable installations, throughout the country, were to be owned 
or controlled by a few large corporate enterprises, as networks 
are today controlled, the spectre of monopoly opinion would 
arise in quite a different form.433 
While the Supreme Court has yet to uphold the constitution-
ality of a general right of access as a remedy for monopoliza-
tion of a communications medium,434 the Court has indicated 
its support for such a right of access under certain circum-
stances. In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion,435 the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of one 
431. 395 U.S. at 391. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. at 
104: 
One of the earliest and most frequently quoted statements of this dilemma is 
that of Herbert Hoover, when he was Secretary of Commerce. While his De-
partment was making exploratory attempts to deal with the infant broadcast-
ing industry in the early 1920's, he testified before a House Committee: "We 
cannot allow any single person or group to place themselves in [a) position 
where they can censor the material which shall be broadcasted to the public, 
nor do I believe that the Government should ever be placed in the position of 
censoring this material." Hearings on H.R. 7357 before the House Committee on 
the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 8 (1924). 
See also Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d 289, 296 (1966). 
432. Cabinet Committee, supra note 50, at 19-20. 
433. Sloan Commission, supra note 50, at 94. See generally Posner, supra note 212, 
at 106-09. 
434. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. at 2830. 
435. 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
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entity, a utility company, controlling access to an effective 
means of communication, the billing envelope. While the 
Court struck down a ban on the utility's mailing of inserts dis-
cussing issues of public policy, the Court pointed out that there 
were other ways the billing envelope could have been regu-
lated which would have been constitutional: "the Commission 
has not shown on the record before us that the presence of the 
bill inserts at issue would preclude the inclusion of other in-
serts that Consolidated Edison might be ordered lawfully to in-
clude in the billing envelope.,,436 Thus, the Court recognized 
that the utility could have been required to include in its envel-
ope inserts containing opposing views.437 
When the Court ruled that a television station's refusal to 
sell time for any political advertising did not violate the First 
Amendment,438 its decision pointed favorably at access rules 
for cable television as potentially "both practicable and desira-
ble. Indeed, the [Federal Communications] Commission 
noted in these proceedings that the advent of cable television 
will afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public 
issues."439 
Finally, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state may utilize 
its inherent "police power or its sovereign right to adopt . . . 
individual liberties more expansive than those conferred by 
436. Id. at 543 (emphasis added). 
437. In fact, this was the remedy the Public Service Commission had originally 
been requested to order. Id. at 532. 
In Buckley, Chief Justice Burger dissented from the Court's ruling that public 
financing of presidential elections was constitutional: 
I would, however, fault the Court for not adequately analyzing and meeting 
head on the issue whether public financial assistance to the private political 
activity of individual citizens and parties is a legitimate expenditure of public 
funds. The public monies at issue here are not being employed simply to po· 
lice the integrity of the electoral process or to provide ajorumjor the use oj all 
participants in the political dialogue, as would, jor example, be the case if free 
broadcast time were granted. 
424 U.S. at 248 (emphasis added). See also BaTlZhaj, 405 F.2d at 1102. In upholding a 
requirement that broadcast stations which carried cigarette advertising devote a sig· 
nificant amount of time to advertisements in opposition to cigarette smoking, the court 
stated: 
INlot all free speakers have equally loud voices, and success in the market· 
place of ideas may go the advocate who can shout the loudest or most often. 
Debate is not primarily an end in itself, and a debate in which only one party 
has the financial resources and interest to purchase sustained access to the 
mass communications media is not a fair test of either an argument's truth or 
its innate popular appeal. 
438. CBS, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973). 
439. Id. at 131. 
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the Federal Constitution."440 In Pruneyard Shopping Center v. 
Robins ,441 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Califor-
nia constitutional provision giving all individuals the right of 
free speech in privately owned shopping centers. The Court 
stated: 
Although appellants contend there are adequate alternative 
avenues of communication available for appellees, it does not 
violate the United States Constitution for the State Supreme 
Court to conclude that access to appellants' property in the 
manner required here is necessary to the promotion of state-
protected rights of free speech and petition.442 
If a state imposes the requirement that a public access chan-
nel be established on its cable television systems, the state will 
be making a decision on the importance of the access channel 
in fulfilling First Amendment goals. Accordingly, it would not 
violate the United States Constitution if a state concluded that 
a cable television public access requirement "is necessary to 
the promotion of state-protected rights of free speech and 
petition. "443 
IV 
Conclusion 
The question of whether public access requirements uncon-
stitutionally infringe on the First Amendment rights of cable 
television operators cannot be answered by simple analogy to 
the constitutional rights of either newspaper owners or televi-
sion broadcasters. A proper analysis cannot "mechanically ap-
ply the doctrines developed in other contexts . . .. The 
unique situation presented ... calls ... for a careful inquiry 
into the competing concerns of the State and the interests pro-
tected by the guarantee of free expression."444 
Such an inquiry reveals that in the context of cable access 
440. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 81. 
441. Id. at 74. 
442. Id. at 85 n.8. That a state statute, as well as a state constitutional provision, can 
adopt more expansive state free speech protection than granted by the United States 
Constitution was made manifest by the Court's discussion of Uoyd Corp. Ltd v. Tan-
ner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) (which held that the federal Constitution did not prohibit the 
owner of a shopping center from banning distribution of handbills on the property of 
the shopping center). The Court stated in Pruneyard that in Lloyd, ''there was no 
state constitutional or statutory provision that had been construed to create rights to 
the use of private property by strangers .... " 444 U.S. at 81 (emphasis added). 
443. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. at 85 n.8. 
444. Young v. American Mini theaters, 427 U.S. at 76 (Powell, J., concurring). 
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requirements, those concerns are not competing but are in fact 
in accordance. There are both State and First Amendment in-
terests in ensuring a diversity of speakers, protecting the indi-
vidual's right to speak and to receive information, and 
promoting peace within a community. Cable access rules fur-
ther all of these goals.445 Access rules are unrelated to the con-
tent of the cable operator's speech, and permit the government 
to remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.446 The net effect 
of such a requirement would be an increase in the extent, vari-
ety, and vigor of public debate.447 
There are several different ways in which access rules can be 
classified. Because they further substantial government inter-
ests which are not only unrelated to the suppression of speech 
but which actually further freedom of expression, and leave 
adequate alternate means for cable operators to communicate 
their messages, the rules meet the constitutional requirement 
of each classification.448 
The Federal Communications Commission in promulgating 
its rules said that an access channel could restore a sense of 
community to a disparate population, increase public partici-
pation in the democratic process, and improve the scope and 
quality of information shared by a locality.449 With the F.C.C. 
barred from imposing its rule, it rests with each state to confer 
these benefits upon its communities. 
445. See text accompanying notes 218-241, supra. 
446. See text accompanying notes 255-261, supra. 
447. See text accompanying notes 228-235, supra. 
448. See text accompanying notes 277-445, supra. 
449. See text accompanying note 112, supra. 
